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In this thesis, we explore how objects affect the space around them. We show that spatial 
information is extracted from even completely novel objects. Information derived from the shape 
of objects is swiftly and automatically integrated into a variety of processes, such as the 
allocation of visual attention, the programming of eye movements, and the perception of motion. 
We provide evidence supporting that the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) of the macaque is able to 
extract such spatial information from objects. We also show that IPS1, the putative human 
homologue of LIP, can represent space not just in pure retinotopic coordinates but can code for 
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The enormous significance of the constantly growing stock of earlier experiences 
in the life of humans and of higher animals can hardly be overlooked. Perception 
itself is also improved through use, practice, and schooling and makes possible an 
increasingly finer, richer, and deeper grasp of things. But these facts should not 
be permitted to blind us to the idea that the fundamental laws of perception are 
present before the accumulation of this stock of experience, and before such 
schooling. Those fundamental laws are not profoundly changed by experience, 
but rather, without the existence and stability of these laws, the store of past 
experience could neither be collected nor utilized.  
Wolfgang Metzger – The Laws of Seeing 
 





Objects in Space 
On March 1972, the Pioneer 10 spacecraft was launched. Attached to it was a gold-
anodized aluminum plaque containing a message to any extraterrestrial intelligent life forms that 
might encounter it (figure 1.1). The plaque, amongst other things, showed a diagram of the 
Earth’s relative position to the Sun and planets, as well as its location relative to several 
prominent pulsars, many of which can be seen from other parts of the galaxy. Also depicted was 
Pioneer’s trajectory as it passed Mars and Jupiter and finally exited our solar system to continue 
its journey to outer space. 
 This message to the stars might be more telling about the human inhabitants of the planet 
Earth than its makers foresaw. Had we been intelligent dog-like creatures, we would most surely 
have equipped Pioneer with chemicals of various smells. The human race instead sent the 
message in pictorial form. This speaks to the tremendous importance of vision for primates 
whose brains have evolved to contain dozens of cortical regions devoted to the processing of 
visual information (Van Essen et al., 2001).  
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The Pioneer plaque has been criticized on the grounds that in order to decrypt the 
message, one needs to have experienced human culture (Gombrich, 1972; Vakoch, 1998). 
Gombrich (1972) notes that Pioneer’s trajectory is marked with a directional arrowhead, a 
symbol impossible for an alien race to decipher since they have presumably never in their history 
had anything equivalent to a bow and an arrow.  
One might also realize that an event extended in time is depicted as a static image; 
Pioneer’s past locations are represented by the arrow’s shaft, with the more distant past 
corresponding to locations closer to the shaft’s end, while the object’s future locations are 
implied by the direction to which the arrowhead points. There is no guarantee that a spatial 
representation of time would make any sense to an extraterrestrial. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. The Pioneer plaque. The image was created by NASA and is in the public domain. 
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Finally, the Earth’s position is shown relative to several other objects in space, but 
reading such a celestial map requires the ability to perform complex coordinate transformations 
of visual information. If an alien found the Pioneer plaque and wanted to get to Earth, it would 
need to not only have some way of representing space as relative to objects in the world, but it 
would have to understand how the map should be scaled up, translated and rotated so as to match 
the real world objects depicted on this flat 2D surface. This is no mean feat. 
This thesis concerns objects in space – not the celestial bodies depicted on the Pioneer 
plaque, but how objects affect the space around them and the neural machinery used for this 
purpose. It will, in a sense, explore how the message sent to other worlds might make intuitive 
sense to us humans because of the way our visual systems have been set up to work.  
Visuospatial Codes 
Let us imagine a simple sighted organism. Its visual needs are quite straightforward. If it 
sees something good, such as food or a potential mate, it needs to orient toward it and approach 
it. If it sees something bad, such as an obstacle or a predator, it should move away and avoid it. 
Its limited behavioral repertoire might be adequately supported by relatively elementary neural 
machinery that codes for where things are in space in relation to the organism. 
For humans and non-human primates alike, light gets transduced to neural signals in the 
retina of the eye. Retinal ganglion cells with partially overlapping dendritic trees tile the retina 
and their dendritic coverage determines their receptive field, or the region of the retina on which 
light must shine in order to change their rate of firing (for a review on the evolution of the 
vertebrate eye, see Lamb, Collin, & Pugh, 2007; for a review on the functional architecture of the 
mammalian retina, see Wässle & Boycott, 1991). In primates, all visual information therefore 
starts out as retinotopic, where nearby neurons tend to respond to light falling on locations close 
to each other on the retina. Several brain regions apparently inherit this type of spatial 
representations where nearby patches of cortex selectively respond to light that falls on nearby 
patches of the retina (Gardner, Merriam, Movshon, & Heeger, 2008; Golomb & Kanwisher, 
2012; Wandell & Winawer, 2011). Just like for our simple sighted organism, this is a way of 
representing where things are relative to our own body – in this case, where things are relative to 




Figure 1.2. Two visual streams. A very influential idea in cognitive neuroscience is that there are at least two 
cortical visual processing streams (Milner & Goodale, 1995; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). Each gets input from 
the primary visual cortex (among other areas), but one moves ventrally to the temporal cortex, while the other is 
more dorsal and ends in the parietal cortex. The ventral stream seems to be important for object identification and 
has been dubbed the ‘what’ stream. The dorsal stream was originally thought to be dedicated to spatial information 
and has therefore been called the ‘where’ stream, but has more recently been called the ‘how’ stream because of its 
importance in action guidance. The human primary visual cortex (V1) is shown in gray, the ventral ‘what’ stream 
can be seen in purple, and the dorsal ‘where/how’ stream is marked in green. The image is published under a 
Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike license, and is originally from: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Ventral-dorsal_streams.svg  
 
Our hypothetical organism might be well served with a one-size-fits-all mechanism for 
the coding of spatial locations. Initially it was also thought that such all-purpose spatial 
representations resided in the posterior parietal lobe (further subdivided into the superior and 
inferior parietal lobules; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 1997; see also figure 1.2). Spatial 
distortions from parietal damage have long been known. Holmes (1919), almost a hundred years 
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ago, described the symptoms of patients who suffered from gunshot wounds to the posterior and 
upper parts of the parietal lobe. These patients seemed unable to construct spatial representations 
from visual information; their eyes would randomly drift instead of purposefully scanning the 
scene, they would reach for an object in the completely wrong direction, and would even directly 
walk into walls as if they had no idea of their position in space. 
However, humans, macaques, and many other primates, unlike our simple organism, are 
capable of complex interactions with their environments. Complex action capabilities might 
require not just a single representation of space, but many specialized ways of coding where 
things are in the world. A monkey swinging from branch to branch presumably needs to have a 
visual system capable of calculating the direction and distance of the next branch not just relative 
to the center of gaze, but relative to her body and the hand with which she grasps it. Since the 
visual information is originally only available in a retinotopic frame of reference, this new 
representation requires the transformation of the original retinotopic space into egocentric 
coordinate frames centered on other parts of the body.  
The main function of the parietal cortex in primates is now thought to be to carry out 
such transformations from sensory signals to a format more directly useful for motor output or 
action guidance (Milner & Goodale, 1995; Orban et al., 2006; Rizzolatti et al., 1997). These 
kinds of visuomotor transformations can occur without awareness and are thought to be highly 
automatic (Milner & Goodale, 1995). Such spatial representations are generally thought to be 
egocentric, which is to say that spatial locations are coded with reference to a part of one’s own 
body, such as the eyes, head, hand, trunk, or mouth (Goodale & Milner, 1992). 
Egocentric coding is not the only way to represent space, and neither is it necessarily 
always the best way. For example, macaque mothers monitor their infants, especially when they 
are beyond reach, in order to detect and avoid any possible threats to the infants (Onishi & 
Nakamichi, 2011). The mothers seemingly have the ability to monitor not just where the infants 
are relative to the mothers themselves, but relative to external objects. In order to be able to 
intervene in time, it is also important for the mothers to predict whether the infant will come to 
any harm before it actually happens; a stalking leopard, even though quite still, is a very serious 
threat. 
Humans rarely are threatened by predators but the ability to use visual information to 
predict where important things will be in the near future nonetheless has obvious survival value. 
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Swiftly and accurately predicting where a moving car is going can make the difference between 
life and death, even for us. Sometimes, though, one might simply wish to monitor a situation 
without it having an immediate effect on oneself. It might be of importance for you to know 




Figure 1.3. USS Northampton. This naval warship was painted with a white bow wave so as to give the false 
impression of high-speed movement in a particular direction even though the ship might in reality be completely still 
(Sumrall, 1971). The image is in the public domain. 
 
Humans seem capable of making such predictions based on visual information on 
objects. Sometimes we cannot help it – it apparently happens whether we like it or not. This has 
been made use of in many venues. An artist might use visual cues to direct your eyes and 
attention to a particular location in a painting that he wishes to emphasize. The same might be 
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done by a keen web designer or a clever advertising company. A magician will misdirect his 
audience’s attention to create his illusion. Such tricks have been used in war. The shape of a false 
bow wave was painted on naval warships so as to trick enemies into misestimating the ships’ 
direction and speed of movement, thus making them harder to target (Sumrall, 1971; see figure 
1.3). Visual objects that redirect attention also keep wandering pedestrians from getting run over 
by cars, as can be seen in figure 1.4. 
 
 
Figure 1.4. Directing attention. This street sign notifies people that they should check for approaching cars. Here, 
an arrow and the words “look left” guide people’s eyes and attention in a particular direction away from the objects 
themselves. The image is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike license, and is originally 
from: http://www.flickr.com/photos/_pek_/3839589571/sizes/o/in/photostream/ 
 
The street sign in figure 1.4 also exemplifies that sometimes objects can give us 
important clues about where other things or events will be in the near future. This, at least at a 
first glance, seems to be an indirect and symbolic way of representing space. Orienting to a spot 
of light is elementary and direct – even plants, which have no nervous system, will do that. 
Sampling information from the spot of light and deciding, on that information, to look 
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somewhere else, instead, is intelligent behavior. When a wise man points to the Moon, only an 
idiot will look at the finger. 
Artists, designers, advertisers, magicians, warmongers, and traffic regulators all have 
discovered that the visual properties of objects can effectively be used to redirect and misdirect 
attention away from the objects themselves. In this thesis, I will look at how objects affect the 
space around them, how they guide the eyes and attention in particular directions relative to 
themselves, under what circumstances they do so, what brain areas are responsible for extracting 
such information, and the format of the spatial code that these brain regions use. 
In chapter 2, “Action-related object coding in the lateral intraparietal area”, I will 
describe my research on how the shape of an object can automatically form a hypothesis 
regarding where to look and pay attention, and how shape selective regions in posterior parietal 
regions of the dorsal visual stream can represent such hypotheses. The lateral intraparietal area 
(LIP) is selective for the shape of objects and plays a role in both overt and covert orienting. This 
makes it a primary candidate region for carrying out the necessary computations for extracting an 
orienting bias from shape.  
In chapter 3, “Form-derived directionality of objects: Its effects on visual attention and 
motion perception”, I look in more detail at how the shape of objects induces a systematic 
orienting bias that is consistent across people and has a measurable strength and directionality. 
Shape attributes rapidly and automatically bias both overt and covert orienting, pushing people 
toward certain locations and away from others. These predispositions do not appear to require 
the recognition of the shape in question, and affect learning of new associations between what 
we see and where we look. Not all associations are made equal; on the contrary, going against 
our inherent biases takes time and effort and might never be fully accomplished. Such biases also 
affect the perception of movement, where the shape-defined directionality of an object is 
integrated into calculations about its probable path of motion. 
The experiments described in chapter 2 and 3 were based on the hypothesis that objects 
can affect the weights given to locations in a spatial priority map (Bisley & Goldberg, 2010; 
Fecteau & Munoz, 2006; Itti & Koch, 2001). It was initially assumed that this spatial priority 
map was represented in retinotopic or eye-centered coordinates. However, there were some hints 
that this might not the case, but that the effects could either instead or in addition manifest 
themselves in a stimulus-centered coordinate system where space is coded not relative to the 
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current eye position but relative to an object. In chapter 4, “A tale of two coordinate systems”, I 
will look more closely into how spatial position is coded in both eye-centered and object-
centered frames of reference and the neural representations of both types of coding systems. 
Several dorsal stream regions, including a likely homologue of LIP in the human intraparietal 
sulcus (IPS1), simultaneously code for the locations of objects in both egocentric and allocentric 
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Many regions within the ventral stream respond selectively to differently shaped objects 
and are thought to support their successful recognition and categorization (Goodale & Milner, 
1992; Logothetis & Sheinberg, 1996; Milner & Goodale, 1995; Palmeri & Gauthier, 2004; 
Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). It therefore came as a surprise when a subregion of the dorsal 
stream, the lateral intraparietal area (LIP), was also found to be shape selective (Durand et al., 
2007; Janssen, Srivastava, Ombelet, & Orban, 2008; Konen & Kastner, 2008; Lehky & Sereno, 
2007; A. B. Sereno & Amador, 2006; A. B. Sereno & Maunsell, 1998; M. E. Sereno, Trinath, 
Augath, & Logothetis, 2002). Although its function is still a subject of debate (Andersen & 
Buneo, 2002; Bisley & Goldberg, 2003, 2010; Colby & Goldberg, 1999; Gottlieb, Kusunoki, & 
Goldberg, 1998; Snyder, Batista, & Andersen, 1997), LIP has mainly been implicated in the 
visual guidance of spatial attention and saccadic eye movements, collectively known as visual 
orienting (Posner, 1980). LIP shape selective activity did not seem to fit well with this role or the 
dorsal stream’s role in action guidance in general, and the nature of these responses was not 
obvious. 
We suggest that the activity of LIP may best be understood as competing orienting biases 
or affordances (Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Gibson, 1979), or the relative merit of the 
possible sources of information worth exploring with the eyes and attention. We propose that the 
shape of objects, because of intrinsic properties and previous experience, systematically biases 
orienting. We hypothesize that LIP plays a crucial role in extracting such a shape-induced 
orienting bias and that this bias is a major source of LIP shape selectivity. We argue that LIP 
incorporates a unique shape code that is tightly coupled to behavior.  
Shape is indeed taken into account when deciding where to look and pay attention. 
Saccades to visual shapes are about as fast and consistent as those to simple point targets (He & 
Kowler, 1991). Such oculomotor guidance does not merely depend on low-level averaging of 
visual elements but appears to have access to a genuine shape representation (Melcher & 
Kowler, 1999). After having looked at an object, people also tend to orient to another point 
within that same object rather than to an equidistant location outside its boundaries or shape 
(Egly, Driver, & Rafal, 1994; Theeuwes, Mathôt, & Kingstone, 2010). In some cases, a shape 
can even guide orienting away from itself. An arrow is a prime example, and unlike what was 
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previously thought, it can reflexively bias orienting (Ristic & Kingstone, 2006; Tipples, 2002). 
While the shape of things can clearly bias orienting behavior, the shape code used for visual 
orienting might not be the same as the one supporting perception; some shape cues appear 
inaccessible to the oculomotor system (Vishwanath, Kowler, & Feldman, 2000).  
Several properties of LIP make it a primary candidate region for carrying out the 
computations necessary for extracting an orienting bias from shape. LIP ranks among the brain 
areas with the greatest capabilities of integrating and distributing information (Modha & Singh, 
2010). It is structurally connected to various visual areas (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991; Lewis & 
Van Essen, 2000), some of which are shape selective (Desimone & Schein, 1987; Pasupathy & 
Connor, 2002), and to oculomotor structures such as superior colliculus (Ferraina, Pare, & 
Wurtz, 2002; Field, Johnston, Gati, Menon, & Everling, 2008), frontal eye fields (Ferraina et al., 
2002; Lewis & Van Essen, 2000; Stanton, Bruce, & Goldberg, 1995), and oculomotor domains 
of the cerebellum (Prevosto, Graf, & Ugolini, 2010). It is thus perfectly situated to gather and 
combine various sources of visual information with the objective of guiding overt and covert 
orienting. 
Materials and Methods 
Overview 
We recorded single cell activity in LIP of awake behaving monkeys, both when passively 
viewing and when acting on particular shapes, to see if and how shape-related LIP responses 
were linked to past and future orienting behavior (see figure 2.1). We probed the location 
selectivity of each LIP neuron, finding a preferred (PREF) and an anti-preferred (ANTI) 
peripheral location. We then briefly mapped the passive neural responses to shapes shown in the 
PREF location, the ANTI location, and the center of the visual field (CENTER). These shapes 
later served as 100% valid central precues in a subsequent task, cueing the monkey to saccade 
either toward the PREF or ANTI location. Some of the shapes used during each recording 
session were completely novel so the monkey saw them for the first time in the passive shape-
mapping task when none of them had yet acquired any particular associations. Others were 
familiar, meaning that they had previously served as central precues in the active shape-saccade 
association task and the monkeys had been trained, over the course of months, to saccade to a 
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particular location when seeing them.  
Surgery, MRI, and Recordings 
Two male macaca mulatta monkeys (monkey J: 10.5 kg, monkey R: 9.5 kg) were 
implanted with titanium head posts for restraining head movements during the training and 
recording sessions. The monkeys had two separate surgeries under isoflurane anesthesia. During 
the first surgery we implanted a recording chamber of diameter 16 mm at approximately 5P and 
12L over the right hemisphere. The chamber was made of MRI compatible plastic material 
(PEEK, polyetheretherketone). The craniotomy was performed during a second surgery after 
structural MRI had verified that the chambers were located above the lateral intraparietal area 
(LIP). 
The structural MRI was also used to properly position a metal guide tube so that an 
electrode would reach LIP. During each recording session, a tungsten microelectrode (1.5 MΩ, 
Alpha Omega) was lowered using a hydraulic microdrive (David Kopf Instruments), and the 
neural signals were filtered and amplified (BAK Electronics). Eye movements were monitored 
and recorded using EyeLinkII (SR Research) with a 500 Hz sampling rate and streamed to a disk 
at 200 Hz. Experimental protocols were in accordance with animal care guidelines of the 
National Institutes of Health (Council, 2011) and Brown University's Institutional Animal Care 
and Use Committee.   
Tasks and Stimuli 
All stimuli were shown on a 1024 x 768 resolution screen with a refresh rate of 100 Hz, 
and the experiments were controlled using in-house software running on Windows XP 
(Microsoft) and QNX RTOS (QNX Software Systems). 
The monkeys were trained on three tasks, run consecutively in each session. In the 
location selectivity mapping task, a yellow fixation square (side length 0.3°) appeared in the 
center of a light gray background. After the monkey acquired fixation, a dark gray target disk 
(radius 1°) was flashed for 110 ms at 7° eccentricity. In each trial the disks were randomly 
chosen to appear in one of eight possible radial directions from the center (22.5°, 67.5°, 112.5°, 
157.5°, 202.5°, 247.5°, 292.5°, or 337.5°; 0° corresponds to a location at the right of fixation; 
numbers increase in counterclock direction). After a brief delay of 60 ms, the fixation square 
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jumped to that same peripheral location, and the monkey was given juice for saccading to it. We 
recorded from LIP neurons which, based on online spike data, were deemed to respond to one or 
more locations. The preferred (PREF) location was defined as the location which evoked the 
highest mean responses over a 250 ms window (from 40 ms to 290 ms after visual onset of the 
peripheral disk). The anti-preferred (ANTI) location was a location of the same eccentricity but 
in the opposite radial direction, in other words 180 degrees away from the PREF. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. The three consecutive behavioral tasks. The approximate position of gaze is marked with a green 
dotted circle. Possible locations of upcoming stimuli are indicated by question marks. Neither the green dotted circle 
nor the question marks were actually present. A, Location selectivity mapping of eight peripheral locations 
equidistant from the center used to determine preferred (PREF) and anti-preferred (ANTI) locations. B, Passive 
shape-mapping task probing responses to visually presented shapes in the PREF, CENTER, and ANTI locations. C, 
Active shape-saccade association task where a centrally presented shape serves as a cue for saccading to the PREF 
or ANTI location. 
 
Each trial of the passive shape-mapping task consisted of four rapid serial visual 
presentations (RSVPs) where black shapes (diameter approximately 3°; see figure 2.2) were 
flashed on a light gray background for 150 ms, with an inter-stimulus interval of 130 ms, in three 
possible locations: CENTER (7° eccentricity), PREF, and ANTI (7° eccentricity), as determined 
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by online spike recordings from the location selectivity mapping task. The monkeys’ eye 
position had to stay within 4° of the center of the screen.
1
 The trials thus always aborted if the 
monkeys looked to the PREF or ANTI locations. A yellow fixation square (side length 0.3°) was 
shown in the center of the screen. 60 ms after the disappearance of the last shape, the fixation 
square jumped to one of four possible locations randomly picked to be up, down, right, or left of 
the center (6° eccentricity). These target locations never overlapped with the PREF or ANTI 
locations. The monkeys were rewarded for making a saccade to the new location of the square.  
 
Figure 2.2. Example shapes. The shapes are not shown to scale. 
                                                          
1
 We fully acknowledge that this large window is not optimal for some of the analyses reported 
in this paper. One of the main findings from the passive shape-mapping task, i.e. that neural 
responses to novel shapes predict future orienting behavior, was unforeseen and the task was not 
specifically tailored to looking at such a relationship. Even the main behavioral effect, i.e. that 
there are apparent predispositions to associate objects of certain shapes with specific looking 
patterns, had never been previously reported. Several related behavioral experiments, described 
in chapter 3, confirmed that objects indeed are not neutral before they are associated with some 
action. Information derived from the shape of novel objects is integrated into a variety of 
processes, such as the allocation of visual attention, the programming of eye movements, and the 
perception of motion. Here, novel behavioral effects were predicted based on the current 
neurophysiological data. Had these effects not been found in people, it would have cast doubts 
on the generality of the neurophysiological findings. 
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For the passive shape-mapping task, a shape and a location were chosen pseudorandomly 
for each presentation, so that all shapes were shown equally often in all three locations. A total of 
eight different shapes were shown during a recording session. In most recording sessions, each 
shape appeared 20 times in each location. Four of the shapes were highly familiar to each 
monkey because he had been previously trained over the course of months to associate them with 
particular locations during the shape-saccade association task, as explained in more detail below. 
In each session we also showed four novel shapes which the monkey had never seen before and 
therefore had no particular associations. All shapes, familiar and novel, were originally generated 
by randomly selecting and overlapping four black strokes or pieces out of a set of 64, and then 
scaling them so that all composite shapes had the same area. Randomly generated sample shapes 
can be seen in figure 2.2.  
The final task was an active shape-saccade association task where the eight shapes 
previously seen in the passive shape-mapping task now served as central precues, cueing the 
monkey to saccade either to the PREF or the ANTI location after a brief delay. Two of the novel 
shapes were randomly chosen to cue the PREF location and the other two cued the ANTI 
location. The same was true for the four familiar shapes, except that their associations were 
randomly chosen at the start of the monkey's training and this initial assignment to a location was 
maintained for the entire training and recording period. Each monkey trained on four sets of 
familiar shapes with four shapes in each, so they were highly familiar with 16 shapes which were 
different for the two monkeys. In each recording session, a set of familiar shapes was chosen to 
match the PREF and ANTI locations of the neuron being recorded from. The active shape-
saccade association task was run in blocks for 96 trials each. The first block had equal numbers 
of novel and familiar shapes. Provided that the monkeys were willing to complete further trials, 
this first mixed block was in most cases followed by three blocks of trials where only novel 
shapes were shown in order to provide more experience with novel shapes. These novel blocks 
were followed by mixed blocks, again provided that the monkeys were willing to work. Our 
analysis will mostly focus on the first block of trials.  
A trial started with the appearance of a central fixation square (side length 0.3°). After the 
monkey acquired fixation, one of the shapes from the previous passive shape-mapping task was 
randomly chosen to appear in the center of the screen and was visible for the remainder of the 
trial. The monkey was required to keep fixating within 1° of the screen center for 500 ms (shape 
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period), after which the fixation square disappeared and two identical gray choice disks (radius 
1°) appeared, one in the PREF location and the other in the ANTI location (choice period). The 
monkey was then free to break fixation by saccading to one of the two choice disks. The shape 
served as a 100% valid central precue so it determined what was considered the correct choice. 
The monkey received visual and auditory feedback for his choice; a correct choice was followed 
by a low-pitched tone and the chosen disk was substituted by a black diamond, while an 
incorrect choice was followed by a high-pitched tone and the disappearance of the chosen disk.  
Cell Recording and Selection 
Recorded action potentials were sorted offline using the WaveClus spike clustering 
algorithm (Quiroga, Nadasdy, & Ben-Shaul, 2004). From this we identified a total of 117 units, 
82 of which were suitable for further analysis (monkey J: N=44, monkey R: N=38). We included 
cells that met the following criteria: a) the assumed PREF and ANTI locations, as determined by 
online spikes from the location selectivity mapping task, corresponded to the actual PREF and 
ANTI locations, as determined by offline analysis, b) firing rate for centrally presented shapes 
remained high enough for the maximum depth of selectivity index to be calculated (see Results), 
c) the monkeys completed all necessary tasks, i.e. the location selectivity mapping task, the 
passive shape-mapping task, and more than one block of the shape-saccade association task. 
Data Analysis  
Unless otherwise noted, all statistical tests were two-sided and had an alpha level of 0.05. 
For repeated measures ANOVAs, results were Greenhouse-Geisser corrected if Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity was significant. 
When analyzing data from the passive shape-mapping and active shape-saccade 
association tasks, we aligned neural responses in every trial to the visual onset of each shape and 
counted the number of action potentials within a 50 ms window centered on the time of onset. 
We repeated this process for windows spaced 10 ms apart. Unless otherwise stated, any reference 




As previously described, data from the location selectivity mapping task was used to 
define a preferred location of each LIP unit. Most units had a preferred location in the 
contralateral hemifield (67 CONTRA units) while a minority preferred a location in the 
ipsilateral hemifield (15 IPSI units). The circular mean direction of the preferred location was 
192°, and the circular standard deviation was 59.7°.  
 
 
Figure 2.3. Example neural responses in the passive shape shape-mapping task. These spike density functions 
show one unit’s responses to familiar and novel shapes shown in the preferred (PREF) location, the center of the 
screen (CENTER), and the anti-preferred (ANTI) location. In the following active shape-saccade association task, 
the FUTURE-ANTI shapes served as 100% valid central precues to the anti-preferred location, and the FUTURE-
PREF served as such cues to the preferred location. 
 
In the passive shape-mapping task, more CONTRA units also showed greater responses 
for shapes presented contralaterally than ispilaterally, and vice versa for IPSI units. One-sample 
binomial tests at times 0 to 190 ms after visual onset of shapes in the passive task confirmed that 
more units kept their location preference (contralateral versus ipsilateral) across these two tasks 
than would be expected by chance (CONTRA units: significant at all times from 30 to 190 ms 
 39 
after shape onset, all ps < 0.001; IPSI units: significant from times 30 to 80 ms after shape onset, 
first p = 0.035, all other ps < 0.008).  Figure 2.3 shows an example unit’s responses to shapes 
shown in different locations.  
LIP units seemed to range greatly in their passive responses to visually presented shapes. 
Some units differentially responded to shapes in more than one location, others showed such 
shape selectivity mainly in a single location, and yet others showed little selectivity for the shape 
of passively viewed stimuli. We wanted to quantify this shape selectivity and test whether shape 
selectivity was cell-specific and location-specific. Furthermore, we wanted to know if and then 
how much passive shape selectivity was affected by experience in the active shape-saccade 
association task. For each neuron and for each location (PREF, CENTER, and ANTI), we 
calculated a depth of shape selectivity (DoS) in the passive shape-mapping task (Rainer & 
Miller, 2000): 
 
      
    ∑  
    
    
 
 
DoS can range from 0 (cell responds equally to all shapes) to 1 (cell responds only to one 
shape). LIP responses are often brief and dynamic, so shape selectivity and preference can 
change over a short period of time. We therefore calculated a DoS for each time window 
centered on 40 ms after visual onset to 190 ms after shape onset (or, equivalently, 40 ms after 
visual offset), and used the maximum DoS index as a measure of the neuron's shape selectivity. 
We did this separately for familiar and novel shapes, and separately for shapes presented in the 
PREF, CENTER, and ANTI locations. Note that for five units, the maximum DoS for the ANTI 
location could not be defined because of low firing rate. From here on, we will use the term 
shape selectivity when referring to the maximum DoS.  
Shape selectivity was significantly positively correlated across all combinations (15 total) 
of location (PREF, CENTER, and ANTI) and stimulus type (familiar and novel). All correlations 
can be seen in figure 2.4, see also figure 2.5. These positive correlation coefficients imply that 
the shape selectivity measures capture a property of the neurons themselves. Within each 
location, the shape selectivity for familiar and novel shapes is highly correlated (r >= 0.75). The 
correlation between shape selectivity in the center and the anti-preferred location is also fairly 
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strong (CENTER vs. ANTI: r >= 0.55) indicating that a unit with relatively high shape 
selectivity in the ANTI location is likely to have a relatively high shape selectivity in the 
CENTER. Shape selectivity in the preferred location, on the other hand, appears to be somewhat 
special. While it is significantly positively correlated with shape selectivity in the other two 
locations, the correlation coefficients tend to be lower (PREF vs. CENTER: r >= 0.34; PREF vs. 
ANTI: r >= 0.28).  
 
 
Figure 2.4. Shape selectivity correlation matrix. This matrix shows the relationship between the shape selectivity 
of LIP neurons as defined by their responses to either familiar or novel shapes and in three different locations (the 
preferred location, the center, and the anti-preferred location of each unit). Numbers indicate Pearson’s r. Ellipses 
are the contours of a bivariate normal distribution with a correlation r (Murdoch & Chow, 1996). 
 
A principal components analysis (rotation: Varimax; extraction of components with an 
Eigenvalue greater than 1) confirmed that shape selectivity in the preferred location is somewhat 
different from shape selectivity as measured in the other two locations. We reduced the six 
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measures of shape selectivity (for familiar and novel shapes in three different locations) to two 
components (explained variance: 49% and 30%, respectively). All the six original shape 
selectivity variables loaded positively on the two factors. The loadings on the first factors were 
still much higher for the ANTI and CENTER shape selectivity measures (loadings >= 0.79) than 
it was for the PREF shape selectivity measures (loadings <= 0.24). The reverse was true for the 
second factor where the loadings for PREF shape selectivity measures were much higher 
(loadings >= 0.89) than for shape selectivity in the other two locations (loadings <= 0.25). The 
shape selectivity of LIP neurons might therefore consist of two components: One which gets a 
greater weight in the preferred location of the neuron, and another which gets a greater weight 
outside of that preferred location. 
We then performed a 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA with shape selectivity as a 
dependent measure and stimulus type (familiar or novel) and location (PREF, CENTER, or 
ANTI) as the independent factors. The selectivity for familiar shapes (M = 0.516) was 
significantly greater than that for novel shapes (M = 0.496; F(1,76) = 5.315, p = 0.024). Shape 
selectivity also significantly varied by location (MPREF = 0.421, MCENTER = 0.556, MANTI = 0.541; 
F(2,152) = 34.606, p = 4.1 x 10
-13
). Follow-up t-tests showed that the shape selectivity of the 
CENTER and ANTI locations did not significantly differ from each other (familiar shape 
selectivity: t(76) = 1.407, p = 0.163; novel shape selectivity: t(76) = 0.387, p = 0.700), but their 
shape selectivity was significantly greater than in the PREF location (shape selectivity for 
familiar PREF vs. familiar CENTER, familiar PREF vs. familiar ANTI, novel PREF vs. novel 
CENTER, and novel PREF vs. novel ANTI, all ps < 5.0 x 10
-6
). We did not detect a significant 
interaction between stimulus set and location (F(2,152) = 0.763, p = 0.468). We do note that the 
selectivity for familiar shapes is only significantly greater than for novel shapes in the central 
location (see figure 2.5) where the familiar shapes had been repeatedly presented in the active 
shape-saccade association task (PREF: t(81) = 0.853, p = 0.396; CENTER: t(81) = 2.183, p = 




Figure 2.5. Relationship between the selectivity for familiar and novel shapes shown in the CENTER location. 
Each marker corresponds to one LIP unit. The line shows the linear least squares fit.  
 
To summarize, the selectivity of responses to visually presented shapes varies greatly 
across cells, where some LIP neurons are consistently more shape selective than others. Shape 
selectivity is highly dependent on location and is much greater outside of the neurons’ preferred 
spatial position. Shape selectivity is enhanced through experience and, although the data on this 
is not definitive, this enhancement might be greatest in the center location where the familiar 
shapes had most often been seen and had been relevant for past behavior.  
Shape Responses Predict Future Orienting Actions  
The first block of the active shape-saccade association task had an equal number of trials 
showing novel shapes and familiar shapes. The monkeys’ performance for familiar shapes was in 
general very good or 92% on average in 73 sessions. If the monkeys were randomly executing 
saccades to the PREF and ANTI locations on novel shape trials then they would be expected to 
make the correct choice on half of those trials. In reality their accuracy ranged from 29% to 90% 
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with a mean performance of 54%. While their performance was significantly better than 
expected based on chance alone (t(73) = 3.355, p = 0.001, one-sample t-test), it was still on 
average very close to chance with a wide performance range. This performance range was 
greater than would be expected had the monkeys guessed randomly (Levene’s test of equal 
variances in the percent correct for novel shapes and an equally large sample of simulated binary 
choices: F=27.447, p = 1.0 x 10
-6
). 
For unknown reasons, learning arbitrary associations between a shape and a saccade in 
general proved to be difficult, and while the monkeys sometimes did quite well, other times their 
performance was considerably worse than expected from mere random guesses. We reasoned 
that the monkeys’ performance was being influenced by the shape of the cues that they had to 
learn. The shape of the novel stimuli might directly influence the monkeys' performance by 
inducing an orienting bias, effectively pushing them toward or pulling them away from the 
correct choice location. 
We wanted to know whether LIP shape selectivity might be the source of such a shape-
induced orienting bias. If LIP responses to novel shapes bias orienting, then that bias can either 
be congruent or incongruent with a shape's future association in the active shape-saccade 
association task. When an LIP neuron responds vigorously to a shape in the passive task, and the 
monkey later learns that when he sees that shape he should saccade toward the neuron's preferred 
location, then the neural shape responses are congruent with the association. If, however, the 
monkey has to learn that the shape is associated with the opposite location, the neural responses 
are incongruent.  
For the passive shape-mapping task, we compared the distributions of each neuron's 
firing rates for the two novel shapes which would later cue the PREF location, and the other two 
novel shapes which would later serve as cues to the ANTI location (from now on referred to as 
FUTURE-PREF and FUTURE-ANTI shapes, respectively). More specifically, for every time 
window between 0 and 190 ms after shape onset, we calculated the area under the receiver 
operating characteristic curve (AUC) comparing these two distributions (Green & Swets, 1966). 
We then scaled the AUC scores so that they could theoretically range from -100 to 100. In the 
rest of the paper we will refer to the scaled score as congruency: 
 
                 (                                   ) 
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  A positive congruency score implies that in general the neural responses to FUTURE-
PREF shapes were higher than to FUTURE-ANTI shapes, i.e. the responses were congruent with 
the future associations of the shapes. The reverse is true for a negative score; it represents 
incongruent activation. The greater the absolute value of a score, the greater was the separation 
between the neural response distributions of FUTURE-PREF and FUTURE-ANTI shapes. We 
finally correlated congruency values with accuracy, or percent correct, for those same shapes in 
the first block of the active shape-saccade association task that immediately followed the passive 
task.   
 
Figure 2.6. Fast passive responses to novel to-be-learned shapes predict future behavioral performance. The 
main graph (in brown) shows the Pearson's correlation (y-axis) between neural congruency scores for novel shapes 
at different time points in the passive shape-mapping task (x-axis) and behavioral performance in the active shape-
saccade association task on trials where those same shapes were used as central precues. The aligned upper graph 
shows the mean responses across neurons, in sliding 50 ms time bins, for novel shapes presented in the PREF 
(green), CENTER (yellow), and ANTI (pink) locations in the passive shape-mapping task. 
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We found that congruency scores based on responses to novel shapes in the passive 
shape-mapping task were significantly correlated with performance on novel shape trials in the 
active shape-saccade association task (figure 2.6). The correlation peaked 50 ms after shape 
onset (r = 0.32, p = 0.003). 
 
 
Figure 2.7. Correlation of congruency scores with four extracted principal components. We reduced 20 
congruency scores from the passive shape-mapping task, one score for each time point, to four principal 
components. A strong correlation with a component indicates that the congruency scores from that particular time 
point contribute greatly to the component scores. 
 
The 20 correlation coefficients are not independent of each other; each neuron’s 
congruency scores are based on neural activity in partially overlapping time bins. This partial 
dependence complicates interpretations of statistical significance. In order to get around this 
problem, we performed a principal components analysis to reduce the 20 time variables down to 
fewer dimensions that are uncorrelated with each other. Each time variable consisted of 82 
measures of the congruency of responses to novel shapes, one for each unit. Four components 
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were extracted (eigenvalues > 1); together they explained 86.5% of the variance of the original 
variables. The four components of the rotated solution (method: Varimax) explained 34.2%, 
20.2%, 16.1%, and 15.9% of the total variance, respectively. The correlations of the original time 
variables with the components are shown in figure 2.7. 
The first, second, and fourth principal components are not significantly correlated with 
performance on novel shape trials in the active shape-saccade association task (first: r(80) = -
0.06, second: r(80) = -0.03, fourth: r(80) = 0.00, all ps > 0.56). The third component, which 
corresponds mostly to congruency of the earliest passive LIP responses to novel shapes, is 
significantly correlated with performance (r(80)=0.28, p=0.01245; threshold for significance 
with Bonferroni correction: 0.0125). 
Thus, rapid, passive responses to novel to-be-learned shapes predict future performance 
in the active shape-saccade association task. When early neural responses in the passive shape-
mapping task were congruent with the future association or rule, the monkeys were more likely 
to choose the correct location in response to seeing those shapes in the active shape-saccade 
association task. 
We suspected this correlation to be mainly driven by neurons with higher shape 
selectivity in the center location where the shapes were then shown in the active shape-saccade 
association task; neurons responding similarly to all the shapes are by definition not very 
informative. To see if the relationship between congruency and behavior significantly increased 
with greater shape selectivity, we regressed accuracy (percent correct in the active shape-saccade 
association task) against congruency (for novel shapes at 50 ms in the passive shape-mapping 
task), shape selectivity (as defined by central novel shapes in the passive shape-mapping task), 
and an early congruency×shape selectivity interaction term, which is of most interest for our 
question. The conditional effects of congruency (Beta = -0.44, p = 0.199) and shape selectivity 
(Beta = -0.12, p = 0.251) did not reach significance, while the congruency×shape selectivity 
interaction was significant (Beta = 0.809, p = 0.020).  
This significant interaction indicates that the effect of congruency on behavioral 
performance is dependent on shape selectivity (figure 2.8). Ranking the units from the least to 
the most shape selective, the bottom one-third shows a correlation of r(25) = 0.05, the middle 
one-third has a correlation of r(26) = 0.34, and the top one-third of the units has a correlation of 





Figure 2.8. LIP neurons with higher selectivity for novel central shapes better predict future behavior. Each 
marker in the scatter plot corresponds to one unit, and larger and darker markers indicate greater shape selectivity. 
The x-axis shows the congruency of responses to novel shapes at time 50 ms after shape onset in the passive shape-
mapping task. The y-axis shows the percent correct for the same shapes in the following active shape-saccade 
association task. The margins show the mean spike density functions (Gaussian kernel, 5 ms SD, 1 ms output 
resolution, responses scaled between minimum and maximum firing rate for each unit) for responses to FUTURE-
PREF (dark gray) and FUTURE-ANTI (light gray) novel shapes in the passive shape-mapping task before 
behavioral performance data was collected. The left margin groups units based on behavioral performance and the 
bottom margin groups them based on neural congruency. 
 
The neural responses which most strongly predicted later behavior occurred so early after 
the visual onset of our stimuli that they are clearly stimulus-driven; it is extremely unlikely – if 
not impossible – that they reflect feedback or an error signal from a motor command such as an 
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eye movement. The congruency scores were also calculated by using all trials, effectively 
collapsing across the retinotopic location of the shape presentations. Additionally, the passive 
shape-mapping task always aborted if the monkeys looked to the PREF or ANTI locations, and 
they were only rewarded if they followed a fixation jump to one of four possible locations which 
never overlapped with the locations of any shape stimuli.  
Nevertheless, we reran some of our analysis using only spiking activity from the passive 
shape-mapping task where the monkeys' eye position stayed within 1.0 degrees of the fixation 
position from the visual onset of a shape until 75 ms after the offset of a shape. We compared 
this to randomly selecting the same number of trials from each session. We repeated this random 
selection 10 times. Both methods result in some data loss, but only the former method selects 
trials based on the monkeys’ eye position. If selecting trials based on eye position gives results 
that are highly similar to those expected from random selection, then we would conclude that eye 
position is not a primary driver of our results. 
The results were similar to our main analysis. The measures of the neurons' selectivity for 
novel shapes were virtually unchanged (correlation between uncorrected and eye position 
corrected data: r=0.98; correlation between uncorrected and randomly selected data: mean 
r=0.97, standard deviation=0.004). The same was true for selectivity for familiar shapes 
(correlation between uncorrected and eye position corrected data, r=0.96; correlation between 
uncorrected and randomly selected data: mean r=0.98, standard deviation=0.004). Shape 
selectivity for familiar shapes was still on average higher than selectivity for novel shapes 
(original data: familiar mean = 0.59, novel mean = 0.56; eye movement corrected data: familiar 
mean = 0.61, novel mean = 0.57; randomly selected data: familiar mean =0.60, novel mean = 
0.58; familiar standard deviation = 0.004, novel standard deviation = 0.003). The earliest 
responses of the neural population to novel shapes in the passive shape-mapping task were most 
predictive of the monkey's behavioral performance in the active shape-saccade association task 
(correlation between percent correct and congruency at 50 ms after shape onset: original data 
r=0.32; eye position corrected data r=0.27; randomly selected data: mean r=0.28, standard 
deviation=0.05). The neurons with the highest shape selectivity for novel shapes were most 
highly predictive of future orienting actions (correlation between percent correct and congruency 
at 50 ms after shape onset for the least, medium, and most shape selective units, respectively; 
original data: r=0.05, r=0.34, r=0.62; eye position corrected data: r=0.10, r=0.22, r=0.53; 
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randomly selected data means: r=0.13, r=0.22, r=0.51; randomly selected data standard 
deviations: 0.11, 0.10, 0.06). We therefore conclude that our results are unlikely driven by 
possible differences in eye position. 
Orienting Actions Affect Shape Responses 
We wanted to see if and how the responses to novel shapes in the active shape-saccade 
association task changed with short-term learning, or learning over the course of a single session. 
We could then contrast these shorter-term learning effects with the effects of long-term learning 
over the course of days, weeks or months.  
In order to look for changes across the day, we examined the responses to novel shapes in 
two blocks of the active shape-saccade association task: the first block in a session and the block 
with the best behavioral performance for novel shape cues in the same session, provided that the 
block included at least 30 novel shape trials and that the monkey showed any behavioral 
improvements after the first block (77 out of 82 units). Note that we refer to shape cues as novel 
as long as they have not been seen in previous sessions, and will use the terms early and late 
novel shape trials. To examine long-term learning effects, we compared neural responses to 
familiar shapes that in the past had been associated multiple times with either orienting to the 
PREF or ANTI location of the neuron recorded from. We did this both for the responses 
recorded in the passive shape-mapping task and in the first block of the active shape-saccade 
association task which immediately followed the passive mapping. 
Specifically, we looked at the differences in the neural responses to shapes that cued the 
PREF and ANTI location by calculating the congruency scores for 50 ms wide windows every 
10 ms from the visual onset of shape, as described in the previous session of the Results. This 
was done separately for responses to familiar shapes in the passive and active task, as well as for 
both early and late novel shape trials in the active task. Only correct trials of the active task were 
included, so in all cases the monkey eventually made an eye movement to the location cued by a 




Figure 2.9. Congruency of the neural population responses systematically changed across a trial of the active 
shape-saccade association task. The mean congruency scores at each time after the visual onset of shape are shown 
for early novel (orange), late novel (gray), and familiar (blue) shape trials. A positive congruency score signifies that 
the firing rate was in general higher during PREF shape trials than ANTI shape trials, while a negative score 
indicates the opposite.  
 
As can be seen in figure 2.9, congruency systematically changed across a trial of the 
active shape-saccade association task. We are mainly interested in the shape period, or the 500 
ms time period between the visual onset of shapes and choice disks. To first briefly describe the 
neural dynamics in the following choice period, the responses of the neural population in all 
 51 
cases became congruent almost immediately after the visual onset of the choice disks, sharply 
became incongruent around 160 ms later, and finally leveled off. This was most apparent for 
familiar shape trials and least apparent for early novel shape trials even though the monkeys’ 
overt behavioral choices were equated. Within a single session of learning where to orient in 
response to seeing a novel shape, the population response dynamics during the choice period 
started to resemble those of the familiar over-learned shape trials.  
We wanted to know whether and then how shape responses were affected by short- and 
long-term learning of associating shapes with orienting to either a neurons’ preferred or anti-
preferred location. We started by looking at the response dynamics within the shape period of the 
active shape-saccade association task for early novel, late novel, and familiar shape trials. We 
first ran three separate repeated measures ANOVAs with time as the single factor. The time 
variable consisted of congruency scores for 10 non-overlapping 50 ms time bins centered on 50 
to 500 ms after stimulus onset. Congruency did not significantly vary over time for early 
(F(6.164,468.435) = 0.702, p = 0.652) or late (F(3.645, 277.008) = 0.533, p = 0.851) novel 
shapes. Congruency did, however, vary over time for familiar shapes (F(3.019, 229.414) = 5.345, 
p = 0.001). Responses to familiar shapes were congruent right after visual onset but became 
increasingly incongruent as the start of the choice period drew nearer. This incongruency might 
reflect experience-dependent mechanisms that prevent the monkeys from looking ahead before 
the appearance of the choice disks. 
We followed up with single sample t-tests at each time point and for each type of cue 
(early novel, late novel, and familiar) where we looked at whether the congruency scores were 
significantly different from zero (30 tests in total). Using conventional significance levels, the 
early novel responses were significantly congruent 450 ms after shape onset (p = 0.032; all other 
ps > 0.074), late novel responses were never significantly congruent or incongruent (all ps > 
0.055), and responses to familiar shapes were significantly congruent 50 ms (p = 0.0005) and 
100 ms (p = 0.035) after shape onset, and significantly incongruent 400 ms after shape onset (p = 
0.036). Early neural responses (i.e. 50 ms after shape onset, M = 6.8, SD = 16.8) to familiar 
shapes were significantly congruent even when a stringent correction for multiple comparisons 
was applied (threshold of significance with Bonferroni correction: 0.0017).  
The mean neural responses to novel shapes were not significantly congruent or 
incongruent at this time, neither in early novel shape trials (M = -0.5, SD = 22.71, one sample t-
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test, t(81) = -0.208, p = 0.836) nor late novel shape trials (M = 0.3, SD = 21.28, one sample t-
test, 80 cells, t(76) = 0.128, p = 0.898) of a learning session. Early responses to familiar shapes 
were significantly more congruent than those to both early (paired samples t-test, t(81)=2.518, 
p=0.014) and late (paired samples t-test, t(76)=2.541, p=0.013) novel shapes. Unlike for the 
novel shapes, the neurons showed characteristic response differences between familiar PREF and 
ANTI shape cues extremely early after the visual onset of the shapes. This difference was modest 
but robust; around twice as many neurons favored familiar shapes that cued their preferred rather 
than their anti-preferred location. 
These early responses to familiar shapes tended to be congruent regardless of whether a 
unit’s preferred location was contralateral or ipsilateral (congruency at 50 ms after shape onset 
for units with contralateral preference: M=6.9, SD=17.37; ipsilateral preference: M=5.9, 
SD=14.49; independent samples t-test for differences in means, t(80)=0.214, p=0.831). Units 
with contralateral preference would be exposed to the same visual stimuli as units with ipsilateral 
preference, but the shapes’ meaning would differ; a shape associated with a contralateral unit’s 
preferred location would be associated with an ipsilateral unit’s anti-preferred location and vice 
versa. Early congruent responses are therefore unlikely to stem from some accidental properties 
of the shapes themselves, but instead reflect the learned task-related relationship between a shape 
and a neuron’s spatial selectivity. 
The responses to the same familiar shapes centrally presented in the passive task did not 
tend to show such a rapid distinction between shapes that in the past cued the PREF and ANTI 
location of the neuron recorded from (M = 0.2, SD = 12.8, one sample t-test, t(81) = 0.119, p = 
0.906). At 50 ms after visual onset, congruency of the responses to familiar shapes was 
significantly greater in the active than the passive task (paired samples t-test, t(81) = 3.556, p = 
0.001). The bottom-up shape responses of LIP neurons can therefore be task-dependent; 
information about learned associations of shapes is preferentially represented in the rapid 
responses of LIP neurons when that information is behaviorally relevant. 
At a first glance, LIP responses to centrally presented shapes might seem little affected 
by the learning that took place within a single session. However, a neural population whose 
mean responses are neither congruent nor incongruent might nonetheless have gone through 
experience-dependent changes that are not reflected in the average congruency scores. In 
addition to looking at population averages, we therefore looked at whether congruency scores for 
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late novel shapes could be predicted based on congruency scores for familiar shapes over and 
above the prediction based on congruency scores for early novel shapes alone.  
Specifically, we performed a hierarchical regression at each of the 10 time points in the 
shape period of the active shape-saccade association task. Congruency scores for late novel 
shapes were treated as a dependent variable. Congruency scores for early novel shapes and 
familiar shapes were entered as predictor variables in consecutive steps. We then looked at 
whether a model that included congruency scores of both early novel and familiar shapes 
predicted congruency scores for late novel shapes significantly better than a model where the 
congruency scores of early novel shapes were used as the sole predictor variable.  
Congruency scores of early novel shapes alone significantly predicted congruency scores 
of late novel shapes at all time points in the shape period (minimum R
2
 = 0.081, maximum R
2
 = 
0.307; all ps < 0.011). Adding congruency scores of the familiar shapes as a second independent 
variable significantly improved the predictive power of the statistical model at time 150 ms after 
shape onset (R
2
 change = 0.042, p = 0.032) and then again at time 300 ms after shape onset and 
at all times from thereon (minimum R
2
 change = 0.095, maximum R
2
 change = 0.225; all ps < 
0.004; threshold for significance after Bonferroni correction: 0.005). While the congruency 
scores of the late novel shapes kept some similarity to the congruency scores of the early novel 
shapes throughout the shape period, they increasingly resembled the congruency scores of the 
familiar shapes as the shape period progressed. Experience-dependent changes in LIP shape 
responses might therefore start to unfold over a relatively short period of learning although these 
changes are seen relatively late after the visual onset of an object.  
Persistent Distinctive Shape-Related Activity after Long-Term Learning 
We have shown that repeatedly associating visual shapes with orienting to particular locations 
can change how LIP neurons respond when those shapes are seen, so that even the earliest neural 
responses can reflect the orienting behavior to which the shapes have been linked. The question 
remains, then, to what extent the responses are overwritten by experience. Do responses to 
familiar shapes that cue the same location still retain some individual characteristics, even 
though the monkeys have been extensively trained on reacting to them in the same way? 
Our experiment was set up so that two centrally presented familiar shapes cued each 
possible target location. We compared the neural responses of such same-meaning familiar 
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shapes to see if responses to shapes repeatedly linked to the same behavior were still distinct 
from one another. We did this by sliding a 50 ms window in 10 ms steps from 0 ms to 1500 ms 
after the visual shape onset in the first block of the active shape-saccade association task, 
counting the number of spikes within each window, and comparing the distribution of the 
number of spikes evoked by same-meaning shapes by calculating the area under the receiver 
operating characteristic curve (AUC) comparing these two distributions (Green & Swets, 1966). 
We did the same for responses from 0 ms to 190 ms after the onset of centrally presented 
familiar shapes in the passive shape-mapping task. Since we had no specific predictions about 
which of any two same-meaning shapes would evoke higher neural activity, we took the absolute 
value of the scaled AUC for each shape pair. For each time point we therefore found two such 
scores for each neuron, one comparing the response distributions of the two familiar PREF 
shapes and the other comparing the two familiar ANTI shapes, and defined the distinction score 
at each time point as the average of the two scores: 
 
                 
 (   (                               )
     (                              )) 
 
This gave us a vector of distinction scores for each neuron that signified how well it 
differentiated among same-meaning shapes at each time point after the visual onset of shape in a 
particular task. The population means of the distinction scores at each time point in the active 
shape-saccade association task can be seen in figure 2.10.  
The distinction scores can theoretically range from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates that the 
neural responses to same-meaning familiar over-learned shapes are indistinguishable, while 100 
signifies that they are completely separable. In reality, the neural responses to two same-meaning 
shapes will almost always be somewhat different by chance alone. In light of our previous 
results, we wanted to know whether there were differences in the early shape responses to 
familiar shapes even though they had repeatedly been associated with the same orienting action.  
We performed a one-sided permutation test to see whether distinction scores for same-
meaning familiar shapes were significantly greater than expected by chance alone. For each 
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shape pair, we shuffled the labels (shape A or B) of the responses in all familiar shape trials and 
calculated a vector of distinction scores based on the shuffled labels. We did this separately for 
trials in the passive shape-mapping task and the active shape-saccade association task, and 
repeated the process 1000 times. Figure 2.10 then shows the distribution of shuffled distinction 
scores at each time point after shape onset in the active shape-saccade association task. The 
graph depicts how much LIP neurons tended to differentiate between same-meaning shapes at 
any given time. 
 
 
Figure 2.10. Distinction scores of familiar shapes in the active shape-saccade association task. Familiar shapes 
that have repeatedly been associated with the same arbitrary orienting action can still evoke differentiable neural 
responses. A permutation test showed that the mean distinction scores were significantly greater than expected by 
chance throughout almost the entire shape period (from 40 ms after shape onset and onward, excluding the time 
window centered at 50 ms after visual onset of shape). 95% of the permuted distinction scores fell within the dark 
gray band, and 99% within the light gray band. 
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The average distinction scores in the passive shape-mapping task first became 
significantly greater than expected by chance at 40 ms after visual shape onset (p=0.031). They 
stayed significant throughout the rest of the time periods tested (i.e. until 190 ms after visual 
onset, highest p=0.011, lowest p<0.001). The average distinction score in the active shape-
saccade association task also first became significant 40 ms after visual onset (p=0.026), 
marginally missed the significance level at 50 ms after visual onset (p=0.056) and stayed 
significantly greater than expected by chance throughout the rest of the shape period (i.e. until 
500 ms after visual onset, highest p=0.044, lowest p<0.001) and beyond.  
The barely missed significance level at 50 ms in the active task is probably due to the fact 
that early responses to familiar shapes start to reflect their associated location or action in the 
task where these associations are relevant for behavior, as described above. At 50 ms, the 
original AUC scores for same-meaning shapes were nonetheless correlated across tasks (PREF 
shapes: r(80) = 0.22, p = 0.043; ANTI shapes: r(80) = 0.24, p = 0.028), indicating that the 
neurons in general kept their some of their selectivity to same-meaning shapes across tasks. 
Initial LIP shape responses probably have a task-dependent and a task-independent component.  
Do the neurons that showed more distinctive responses to same-meaning shapes then not 
carry any information about the associated orienting action? In order to address this question, we 
divided the neural population into two subgroups based on distinction score at 50 ms after shape 
onset in the active shape-saccade association task (low difference score group, N = 41, difference 
score at 50 ms: M = 12.6, SD = 4.30; high difference score group, N = 41, difference score at 50 
ms: M = 29.2, SD = 8.72). The response dynamics of the two subgroups were highly similar; 
they each showed the same characteristic repeated switchover of congruent and incongruent 
responses. The neurons that showed persistent distinctive shape-related activity therefore carried 
information about the associated orienting action at the same time. 
Discussion 
We find that rapid responses of LIP neurons to never-before-seen shapes predict future 
orienting behavior when those shapes are encountered again and should be acted on. We also 
find that rapid LIP shape responses reflect the orienting actions that in the past were associated 
with the shapes. Our results indicate that shape selective responses in LIP are closely tied to this 
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region's role in orienting.  
LIP is interconnected with the frontal eye fields (FEF) and the anterior intraparietal area 
(AIP) which both have been found to be selectively responsive to the shape of at least some 
objects (Durand et al., 2007; Murata, Gallese, Luppino, Kaseda, & Sakata, 2000; Peng, Sereno, 
Silva, Lehky, & Sereno, 2008; M. E. Sereno et al., 2002). LIP is also known to be interconnected 
with shape selective areas of the temporal lobe (Webster, Bachevalier, & Ungerleider, 1994) but 
visual onset latencies of neurons in those regions tend to be long (Baylis, Rolls, & Leonard, 
1987; Kiani, Esteky, & Tanaka, 2005; Tamura & Tanaka, 2001). Nonetheless, some regions do 
have relatively short latencies. For example, area TEa in the superior temporal sulcus sends 
projections to LIP (Blatt, Andersen, & Stoner, 2004) and at least some neurons there have short 
visual latencies (Baylis et al., 1987). V4 is another candidate primary input region. It is tuned to 
shape features (Kobatake & Tanaka, 1994) and has known feedforward connections to LIP (Blatt 
et al., 2004; Ungerleider, Galkin, Desimone, & Gattass, 2008). These connections, however, are 
mainly from the V4 peripheral field representations (Ungerleider et al., 2008), and even though 
some V4 neurons have been reported to have visual latencies on the order of around 50-60 ms 
(Lee, Williford, & Maunsell, 2007), the majority appears to respond with much longer latencies 
(Schmolesky et al., 1998).  
Here we find that orienting-related shape responses in LIP appear so early after visual 
onset that it is highly unlikely that they are the result of feedback from other shape selective 
areas, nor are they likely the result of feedback from motor commands. Instead these responses 
appear to be generated from the initial bottom-up wave of visual signals that reach LIP. It is 
possible or even likely that LIP shape selectivity is not solely inherited from ventral visual 
regions but is created de novo in the parietal cortex from yet unknown inputs. Even though it is 
doubtful that shape information reaches LIP solely through a circuitous route through the 
temporal cortex, we do consider it likely that LIP eventually receives some information about 
visual objects from the temporal cortex. 
The earliest, apparently visual responses of LIP neurons can carry information about 
well-established yet still arbitrary associations of shapes with particular orienting actions, and 
later shape responses are affected by shorter-term learning of novel arbitrary visuomotor 
mappings. Several brain regions have been implicated in the acquisition and retainment of such 
arbitrary visuomotor associations (for reviews, see e.g. Brasted & Wise, 2004; Graybiel, 2005; 
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Fadila Hadj-Bouziane, Meunier, & Boussaoud, 2003; Murray, Bussey, & Wise, 2000; 
Passingham, Toni, & Rushworth, 2000; Seger, 2009; Wise & Murray, 2000). The premotor 
cortex – including the supplementary eye fields – (Brasted & Wise, 2004; Chen & Wise, 1995a, 
1995b), the prefrontal cortex – including the frontal eye fields – (Asaad, Rainer, & Miller, 1998; 
Bussey, Wise, & Murray, 2001; Chen & Wise, 1995b; Pasupathy & Miller, 2005), the medial 
temporal lobe (Brasted, Bussey, Murray, & Wise, 2003; Mattfeld & Stark, 2011; Murray & 
Wise, 1996), and the basal ganglia (Brasted & Wise, 2004; Hadj-Bouziane & Boussaoud, 2003; 
Pasupathy & Miller, 2005; C.A. Seger, 2009; Tremblay, Hollerman, & Schultz, 1998; Williams 
& Eskandar, 2006) all might play a role in the initial learning of a new mapping between a 
stimulus and a response. Learning is also supported by dopaminergic reward prediction errors 
from midbrain structures (Bar-Gad, Morris, & Bergman, 2003; Tremblay et al., 1998). As 
learning progresses and the behavior becomes more automatic, other parts of the basal ganglia 
(Nixon, McDonald, Gough, Alexander, & Passingham, 2004; Seger, 2009) and the premotor 
cortex (Kurata & Hoffman, 1994; Nixon et al., 2004; Passingham, 1988) might start to take part 
in or even take over the representation of the overtrained associations. It has been argued that 
subcortical regions gradually train cortical areas on the associations so that eventually the 
behavior can be supported by the cortex (Pasupathy & Miller, 2005) although there have also 
been reports of simultaneous learning-related changes in neuronal activity in cortical and 
subcortical structures (Brasted & Wise, 2004). 
The role of the parietal cortex in arbitrary visuomotor mapping is somewhat 
controversial. Functional neuroimaging studies have reported that neural activity in the parietal 
cortex can be affected by associative learning that happens over the course of a single session 
(Deiber et al., 1997; Eliassen, Souza, & Sanes, 2003), and that the parietal cortex can become 
progressively more involved as the arbitrary associations become increasingly automatic and 
overtrained (Eliassen et al., 2003; Grol, de Lange, Verstraten, Passingham, & Toni, 2006). 
Removing parts of the parietal cortex however does not seem to affect the learning of new 
associations or the retention of familiar ones (Pisella et al., 2000; Rushworth, Nixon, & 
Passingham, 1997). As an example, even though LIP neurons can become sensitive to colors if 
they have been arbitrarily associated with certain behaviors (Toth & Assad, 2002), monkeys do 
not have particular problems with relearning a similar task after parietal lesions, including a 
lesion of the lateral intraparietal area (Rushworth et al., 1997).  
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Brain areas other than the posterior parietal cortex might thus be responsible for the 
learning of a new arbitrary mapping between seeing a shape and saccading to a particular 
location. As learning progresses, the responses of LIP neurons to the novel shapes increasingly 
resemble activity seen for familiar shapes that share their meaning (i.e. cue the same location) 
although this happens relatively late after visual onset. This information is not related in any 
obvious way to the responses evoked by the presentation of visual stimuli in the preferred or 
anti-preferred locations of LIP neurons; it might be independent of the neurons’ spatial 
selectivity and could be considered akin to the categorical information that has been previously 
reported to exist in LIP (Fitzgerald, Freedman, & Assad, 2011; Freedman & Assad, 2006, 2009). 
Such late categorical information could be fed back to LIP from other regions such as the 
prefrontal cortex which is thought to play a critical role in the classification of objects and events 
(Merchant, Crowe, Robertson, Fortes, & Georgopoulos, 2011; see Miller & D'Esposito, 2005 for 
a discussion on top-down control signals originating in the prefrontal cortex; see Pan & 
Sakagami, 2012 for a review of categorical representations in the prefrontal cortex; see Carol A 
Seger & Miller, 2010 for a review of the neuroscience of categorical learning). Such task or rule 
selective activity in LIP (Stoet & Snyder, 2004) might be relayed to LIP from prefrontal regions 
(Asaad, Rainer, & Miller, 2000) like the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex with which it is 
structurally connected (Blatt et al., 2004). Through top-down control, the prefrontal cortex might 
be able to suppress information in more posterior regions when it is irrelevant for the task at 
hand (Chao & Knight, 1998; Miller & D'Esposito, 2005).  
Once an animal has learned to arbitrarily associate a shape cue with saccading to a 
particular location, the animal almost always looks to the preferred location of a neuron 
following the presentation of particular shape cues, and looks to the anti-preferred location 
following the presentation of other shape cues. In the former case, the shape cues are succeeded 
by increased neural activity due to the orienting behavior itself and the corresponding visual 
inputs might gradually strengthen over time through small changes of synaptic weights. In the 
latter case, shape cues are followed by relatively lesser activity and the corresponding visual 
inputs could get relatively weaker with more experience. Over long periods of time, certain 
shape cues appear to gain the ability to rapidly and automatically guide attention to a particular 
spatial location. LIP neurons reflect this by responding to these cues as if a weak visual stimulus 
was shown in the corresponding empty location. When the association between a visual stimulus 
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and a response is highly overlearned, LIP thus might become able to support extremely rapid 
arbitrary visuomotor transformations independent of top-down feedback from regions such as the 
prefrontal cortex (Swaminathan & Freedman, 2012). Without parietal cortex, the associations 
could still be remembered, but the associated behavior might both be slower and less automatic 
as, for example, measured by greater dual-task interference.  
The associations are still flexible enough to be sensitive to the situation; LIP shape 
responses contain information about an associated location, but while this effect is rapid enough 
to be stimulus-driven, it also appears to be gated. It is only seen in the task in which the shape-
action associations were learned, and in which they were behaviorally relevant. These learned 
shape-induced orienting biases might be suppressed when faced with a task where this 
information is irrelevant or even counterproductive. This is in accordance with studies that find 
that the attentional capture of salient visual objects can be modulated or even abolished 
depending on the current task set (Eimer & Kiss, 2008; Folk & Remington, 1998; Folk, 
Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Kiss, Jolicœur, Dell'Acqua, & Eimer, 2008; Hermann J Müller, 
Geyer, Zehetleitner, & Krummenacher, 2009). Contextual changes in response gain have also 
been reported in LIP where the responses to salient inputs become greater when they are 
behaviorally relevant (Balan & Gottlieb, 2006; Gottlieb, Balan, Oristaglio, & Schneider, 2009).  
With enough training, any shape might acquire the ability to bias orienting to a particular 
location. However, our results indicate that not all associations are made equal; some shape-
orienting associations appear to be more intuitive than others. Stimulus-driven LIP responses to 
novel visually presented shapes predict orienting actions in future situations when those shapes 
are encountered again and become behaviorally relevant. In a nutshell, when a cell responds 
more to location A than B, and more to shape 1 than 2, then monkeys are more likely to associate 
shape 1 with orienting to location A, and shape 2 with location B. Our results call into question 
the assumption that central visual cues are neutral before having been explicitly associated with 
particular locations. There might not be such a thing as a neutral shape.  
Follow-up behavioral work, described in chapter 3, showed that information derived from 
the shape of even completely novel, randomly generated objects indeed biases the allocation of 
visual attention and eye movements to particular locations in space. The effects are stimulus-
specific and replicable across subjects and tasks. This happens swiftly and automatically without 
specific learning or training and is not easily overridden by short-term experience. These links 
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between shape and space can be thought of as initial hypotheses, or first guesses, on where to 
look and pay attention, and LIP either creates or has access to such information derived from 
shape. The fact that novel behavioral effects were predicted based on our neurophysiological 
findings makes it likely that they are generalizable and relevant in several situations. 
It is still conceivable that early passive responses to novel shapes predict future orienting 
because of the specific training the monkeys were given. The learned orienting actions associated 
with familiar shapes could possibly generalize to novel shapes that share some of their features. 
This might happen, but we do not think that it can account for our results. If this was the case, we 
would expect the effects of long-term shape-saccade associations to be apparent in the rapid 
passive responses to familiar shapes. Instead, it appears that the effects of long-term learning are 
not present during passive viewing of shapes. We therefore think that the early passive responses 
to novel shapes reflect an exogenously driven orienting bias that is not experience-dependent in 
any traditional sense. 
Shape responses in LIP can be modified and overridden but not completely overwritten 
by experience. LIP neurons carry information about the orienting action associated with a shape 
and which the monkey is going to perform. Literally at the same time the responses to shapes can 
be distinct even though they were both similarly acted on in the past and will lead to the same 
orienting behavior in the future. We speculate that persistent response differences to same-
meaning shapes would have supported the monkeys’ orienting actions at the beginning of 
training in a similar way as LIP neural responses to novel shapes seemingly bias behavior. The 
interesting possibility still remains that LIP incorporates a combinatory code of an orienting bias 
and an object tag (look there at that thing).  
Orienting guided by central cues is often described as endogenous, voluntary, or 
controlled, as opposed to the exogenous, reflexive, and automatic effects of peripheral cues 
(Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; Posner, 1980). Some central cues, such as arrows (Ristic & Kingstone, 
2006; Tipples, 2002) and eye gaze (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998), can 
nonetheless evoke fast reflexive orienting shifts. Eye gaze of a conspecific is also known to 
affect both a monkey's orienting and the firing rate of a subset of LIP neurons (Shepherd, Klein, 
Deaner, & Platt, 2009). Extensive training of associating a central shape cue with an orienting 
response changes the behavior of LIP neurons so that they start to respond to this shape as if it 
was a visual stimulus presented in the cued spatial location. A former endogenous visual cue 
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might therefore be said to become exogenous with enough training.  
Our current results and several follow-up behavioral experiments described in chapter 3 
suggest that even unfamiliar nonsense objects may induce such an orienting bias because of their 
shape. We speculate that eyes, arrows, and other orienting symbols, through natural and cultural 
selection, may have acquired their distinctive shape partly because their shape automatically 
biases — or affords — orienting to particular locations. This bias could then have been further 
amplified by life-long learning through repeatedly associating such a shape with the appearance 
of interesting things in the direction to which it points. Our results support the idea that LIP has 
access to or can carry out the necessary computations for extracting such an orienting bias from 
shape. This bias could be learned and arbitrary, or directly driven by shape properties that affect 
the correspondence (Lambert, Roser, Wells, & Heffer, 2005) of an object with the preferred 
locations of LIP neurons, such as spatial asymmetry, central axis orientation, a salient part of an 
object, or other factors worth investigating in further studies.  
Thinking of LIP shape selectivity as serving the purpose of orienting helps to make sense 
of the puzzling finding that LIP and its putative human homologue can be relatively tolerant to 
image transformations like scaling and translation (Janssen et al., 2008; Konen & Kastner, 2008; 
A. B. Sereno & Maunsell, 1998). Such invariance has most often been thought to be a hallmark 
of the object- and form-sensitive ventral visual pathway (Booth & Rolls, 1998; Robert 
Desimone, Albright, Gross, & Bruce, 1984; Gross, 1973; Ito, Tamura, Fujita, & Tanaka, 1995; 
Logothetis & Sheinberg, 1996; Tanaka, 1996). Visual stimuli can however also show invariance 
of the orienting bias they evoke, such as when seeing a face tilted 90 degrees evokes orienting 
shifts to the side to which the person's eyes would have been looking had the face been in its 
canonical upright position (Bayliss & Tipper, 2006; Bayliss, di Pellegrino, & Tipper, 2004), or 
when words make people orient to the location in which the objects they denote are usually 
found (Estes, Verges, & Barsalou, 2008). We expect LIP neurons to be relatively invariant to 
changes in a visual stimulus that preserve not its identity or form but the strength or direction of 
its orienting bias.  
Both eye movements and attention are often probed with simple stimuli such as points or 
gratings but these are not the things we regularly encounter outside the lab. The rules governing 
orienting behavior must be tailored to looking at the variably shaped things found in the real 
world. Our results support the idea that shape information feeds into a specific neural network 
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that identifies the possible sources of visual information worth exploring further by means of 
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The visual world is not static; within it, things are moving and we are often moving 
ourselves — if not our bodies then at least our eyes which constantly scan the visual scene. 
Processing dynamic input requires efficient extraction of information about the current state of 
the environment to make predictions about where important things will be in the near future. We 
should guide our eyes and attention not to an object’s previous location, but to where it is likely 
to be once action can be taken. Fortunately, under normal circumstances, an object does not 
randomly change location from one moment to the next; its future state depends on its past state. 
An optimized system would be able to use such information to accurately predict an object’s 
future location or motion path from a single snapshot in time. This could bias both overt and 
covert visual orienting so that objects can be located, tracked, and sampled even in a dynamic 
world. Here we test the hypothesis that information derived from an object’s shape enables the 
brain to make such inferences. 
Within the visual system, the dorsal pathway’s role in visual orienting, tracking, and 
motion analysis is well-established (Andersen, 1997; Colby & Goldberg, 1999; Mountcastle, 
Lynch, Georgopoulos, Sakata, & Acuna, 1975; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982; Van Essen & 
Gallant, 1994). In addition, some regions of the dorsal stream are responsive to the shape of 
objects (Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004; Janssen, Srivastava, Ombelet, & Orban, 2008; Konen & 
Kastner, 2008; Lehky & Sereno, 2007; Murata, Gallese, Luppino, Kaseda, & Sakata, 2000; 
Oliver & Thompson-Schill, 2003; Red, Patel, & Sereno, 2012; Sakata et al., 1998; Sakata, Taira, 
Murata, & Mine, 1995; A. B. Sereno & Amador, 2006; A. B. Sereno & Maunsell, 1998; M. E. 
Sereno, Trinath, Augath, & Logothetis, 2002; Taira, Mine, Georgopoulos, Murata, & Sakata, 
1990). The fact that shape selectivity exists in cortical areas beyond the ventral visual stream 
(Desimone, Albright, Gross, & Bruce, 1984; Gross, Rocha-Miranda, & Bender, 1972; Logothetis 
& Sheinberg, 1996; Tanaka, Saito, Fukada, & Moriya, 1991) argues against regional 
specialization for particular stimulus attributes, emphasizing the need to consider function and 
goal in relation to object properties. Shape information might be integrated with various other 
cues and tailored to a particular process or task. Indeed, the shape of an object influences 
processes thought to depend on the dorsal visual stream, such as visual orienting and estimation 
of motion, in addition to object recognition and categorization, which are classically linked with 
the ventral visual stream. 
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For example, the oculomotor system seems able to take into account the global shape of 
an object during saccade planning (He & Kowler, 1991). This kind of visual orienting does not 
merely depend on low-level averaging of visual elements but has access to a higher level 
representation of the object’s shape (Melcher & Kowler, 1999). This shape information may be 
partially or wholly independent from the representation used for perception (Vishwanath, 
Kowler, & Feldman, 2000). The shape of an object guides overt and covert attention within the 
object itself and can, in special cases, push attention away (Driver et al., 1999; Fischer, Castel, 
Dodd, & Pratt, 2003; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Hommel, Pratt, Colzato, & Godijn, 2001; 
Kuhn & Kingstone, 2009; Tipples, 2002, 2008). An arrow is a prime example. Despite initial 
thoughts to the contrary (Jonides, 1981), arrows automatically bias orienting (Hommel et al., 
2001; Kuhn & Kingstone, 2009; Tipples, 2002, 2008). This may be partially due to repeated 
association of this particular shape and its referent; something often appears in the direction to 
which an arrow is pointing. Here, we argue that this association is not arbitrary; initially, the 
symbol might have been selected because its shape already had an inherent directionality that 
automatically evoked an orienting bias. This bias might again be derived from the fact that the 
structure of a real arrow facilitates a stable flight path in a single direction. In general, the shape 
of objects constrains their movements. It would therefore be beneficial for the visual system to 
use shape information to predict an object’s probable motion path and to use such predictions for 
overt and covert visual orienting. 
Shape or form cues are integrated into motion calculations, (see Kourtzi, Krekelberg, & 
van Wezel, 2008, for a review). For example, the oriented trace or streak left by a fast-moving 
object determines its perceived axis of motion (Burr & Ross, 2002; Geisler, 1999). Dynamic 
Glass patterns, which contain no coherent motion, can also lead to the perception of movement 
and affect the tuning of motion selective neurons (Krekelberg, Dannenberg, Hoffmann, 
Bremmer, & Ross, 2003; Krekelberg, Vatakis, & Kourtzi, 2005; Ross, Badcock, & Hayes, 2000). 
Likewise, still photographs depicting objects in motion evoke greater activation in motion 
selective cortical regions than do photographs of stationary objects (Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000; 
Senior et al., 2000). An object’s remembered location is also shifted along its implied path of 
motion (Freyd & Finke, 1984). This shift is lost when motion selective cortical regions are 
temporarily deactivated (Senior, Ward, & David, 2002). With some exceptions (e.g. Caplovitz & 
Tse, 2007; Tse & Logothetis, 2002), most studies on the effects of form or shape cues on motion 
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involved simple non-object-like stimuli (e.g. motion streaks, Glass patterns), or recognizable 
animate or inanimate objects or scenes depicting familiar events or actions. 
The studies described in this paper were stimulated by the idea that shape information 
existing in dorsal stream regions is tailored to and supports the function of these areas in spatial 
perception and action guidance (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Milner & Goodale, 1995; Ungerleider 
& Mishkin, 1982). We explore the role of shape information in visual orienting and motion 
calculation which have well-known neural substrates in the dorsal stream. In experiments 1 and 
2, we establish that people consistently deem novel shapes to “point” in particular directions. We 
then look at the effects of this shape-derived directionality on visual orienting (experiments 3, 4, 
and 7) and motion perception (experiments 5, 6, and 7).  
Our work shows that objects have intrinsic directionality derived from their shape. This 
shape information is swiftly and automatically incorporated into the allocation of overt and 
covert visual orienting and the detection of motion, processes which are inherently directional. 
While covert attention might be split under some unusual circumstances (Awh & Pashler, 2000; 
Hahn & Kramer, 1998; Kramer & Hahn, 1995), our eyes only move in one direction at a time. 
Likewise, a single object only moves in one direction at any given time point. Attention is 
automatically pushed away from the object in a direction that depends on the object’s shape. This 
in turn is incorporated into the calculation of the object’s probable path of movement; detection 
of an object’s direction of motion is facilitated if it is congruent with the inherent shape-derived 
directionality of the object and hindered if shape directionality and motion directionality oppose 
each other. Importantly, such form-dependent directional biases are not limited to well-known or 
over-learned objects or tasks. Instead, they are seen for meaningless shapes, with which people 
have no prior experience, in a variety of settings and regardless of whether people have any 
intent or reason to use this directional information. This suggests that shape-related directional 
biases are ever present and are given weight in predictions or simulations of the upcoming state 




Experiments: Methodological Overview 
A total of 114 people participated in one of seven experiments. Each person took part 
only once. They reported normal or corrected to normal vision and were paid for their 
participation. All participants gave their written consent. The experimental protocol was 
approved by Brown University’s Institutional Review Board. 
The experiments were controlled by a computer console running on the QNX real-time 
operating system (QSSL; QNX Software Systems). It communicated with a Windows XP PC 
through a direct high-speed Ethernet connection. This computer ran custom-made software based 
on OpenGL for graphics display. In experiments 1-3, stimuli were shown on a standard 20" 
cathode ray tube monitor (width: 41 cm; height: 30 cm) with 1024 x 768 resolution. In 
experiments 5-7, they were shown on a high speed 23" widescreen LCD monitor (width: 51 cm; 
height: 28 cm) with 1920 x 1080 resolution. In experiment 4, half of the participants were run 
using the former setup, and half the latter. The monitors’ vertical refresh rate was 100 Hz for all 
experiments. The displays were placed at a distance of 57 cm in front of the subjects.  
Participants were seated in a dark, quiet room in front of a computer screen. A black 
curtain was draped around them and the computer screen. Participants’ heads were held still by a 
chin rest. In experiments 3, 4, and 7, people’s eye movements were monitored with an EyeLink 
1000 eye tracker (SR Research). A high-speed camera and an infrared light source were desk-
mounted under the computer monitor. Eye gaze was monocularly recorded at 1000 Hz. The 
analog signal was sampled and digitized at 200 Hz. The eye tracker was calibrated by asking 
participants to saccade to and fixate several small targets that appeared in random locations on 
the screen. Eye tracking was not performed in experiments 1, 2, 5, and 6. 
An alpha level of 0.05 is assumed for all statistical analysis of the data. Statistical tests 
are two-sided. Results are Greenhouse-Geisser corrected for deviations from sphericity when 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity is significant. Effect sizes are estimated using Pearson’s r, Cohen’s d 
(mean difference / standard deviation of difference) and partial eta squared (ηp
2
). Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals for within-subject comparisons and are calculated using 
Cousineau’s method (2005) with the correction described by Morey (2008).  
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Experiment 1: Directionality Assessment 
The aim of experiment 1 was to assess the extent to which people agree on the 
directionality of objects based on their shape alone. We did not want to constrain the 
interpretation of our results with our preconceptions about what might make a shape directional. 
We therefore constructed a variety of random shapes with which people had no previous 
experience and empirically determined their directionality. We asked people to judge where each 
of the novel shapes pointed or directed them and determined if people’s judgments were more 
similar than would be expected by chance. If judgments of a majority of the shapes deviate from 
circular uniformity, we would conclude that directionality is a general property of a wide variety 
of shapes. 
Method 
Participants. 16 people (9 women) participated in this experiment. Their ages ranged 
from 18 to 36 (M=25).  
Stimuli. 80 novel shapes were generated by superimposing two filled polygons. Each 
polygon was made by fitting a spline to randomly generated coordinates (8 for simple or 16 for 
complex shapes) on a 2D plane. The algorithm was based on the General Polygon Clipper library 
(v. 2.32) which is freely available for non-commercial use (Murta, 2000; see also Vatti, 1992). 
Shapes were scaled to an equal area. Their diameter was approximately 4°. Of the 80 shapes, 20 
were made symmetrical by reflecting one side around the y-axis. The contours of the shapes 
were densely sampled and translated so that the means of their contour coordinates would 
coincide. Each shape was randomly rotated around this pivot and kept this rotation throughout 
the experiment and for all participants. The same method was used to make additional shapes for 
a short practice session. All shapes were shown as white, filled silhouettes. The shapes can be 
seen in figure 3.1. 
Design. Each person completed 360 trials, out of which 40 were control trials and 320 
were experimental trials (80 shapes x 4 repetitions). The trials were spread across five blocks and 





          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
 
Figure 3.1. All novel shapes. Shapes are shown pointing to the right, as judged by people in experiment 2. All 
novel shapes were used in experiments 1 and 2. Red and orange shapes were used in experiments 3, 5, 6, and 7. Red 
shapes were used in experiment 4. 
 
Procedure. People were instructed to look to the center of the screen at the beginning of 
each trial. A single central shape and a surrounding gray circle (diameter 26°) were presented on 
a black background. The shape was on for 100 ms but the circle stayed visible throughout the 
trial. The task is depicted in figure 3.2. 
People used a computer mouse to drag a gray line in the direction to which they thought 
the shape pointed or directed them; longer lines indicated stronger confidence. The line was 
drawn in real time from the screen center to the current position of a gray circular cursor 
(diameter 0.4°) and could be drawn as far as to the surrounding circle. Participants clicked the 
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left mouse button to indicate their response. They were encouraged to not think much about their 
responses but instead go with their intuition.  
 
 
Figure 3.2. Task in experiment 1. People judged the directionality of novel shapes by dragging a line in the 
direction to which they thought the shapes pointed or directed them. 
 
In a minority of trials, no shape was shown and participants instead dragged a line to the 
position of a small disk. All participants performed well on these control trials, ensuring us that 
they paid attention to the task at hand and could position the line appropriately. Before beginning 
the experiment, people completed a short practice block. 
Results 
Each of the 16 participants judged the direction of each shape four times, giving a total of 
64 data points for each of the 80 random shapes. All shapes with their directional judgments are 
shown in figure 3.3.  
We tested for circular uniformity of the directional judgments of each shape. Visual 
inspection of the click endpoints indicated that some of the shapes were unidirectional, some 
were bidirectional, and yet others were multidirectional. We therefore performed two different 
statistical tests on each shape: A Raleigh test and Rao’s spacing test. The Raleigh test assumes 
that the samples are drawn from a von Mises distribution (analogous to the normal distribution 
for non-circular data) and is useful for detecting deviations from uniformity when a shape has 
one main direction (Berens, 2009). Rao’s spacing test can detect deviations from a uniform 
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distribution for shapes that are neither unidirectional nor axially bidirectional (Berens, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 3.3. All shapes and directional judgments. 80 novel shapes are shown with the endpoints (yellow circles) 
of all “drag-and-clicks” used for directional judgments in experiment 1. Asymmetrical shapes are marked with a 
magenta number, and symmetrical shapes are marked with a green number. 
 
A participant’s decision criterion for assigning directionality could evolve over the course 
of the experiment. For each shape, we therefore tested for significant deviations from circular 
uniformity using only the first directional judgment of each participant. Instead of using all 64 




Table 3.1. Statistics for tests of circular uniformity: Shapes 1-40. For each shape, the first directional assessment 
of every participant was used, giving a total of 16 data points for each test. A star symbol (*) is used to indicate that 
the directional assessments of a shape significantly deviate from circular uniformity. The approximate p-values for 
Rao’s spacing test are, more specifically, the smallest commonly used alpha levels at which the test would be 
significant. The statistics are calculated using the Circular Statistics Toolbox for MATLAB (Berens, 2009). Shape 













Rao test  
U 
1  * 0.194 0.001 1.647 205.897 
2  * 0.821 0.001 0.203 232.472 
3 * * 0.001 0.001 6.211 209.615 
4  * 0.153 0.001 1.883 237.606 
5 * * 0.032 0.010 3.359 197.272 
6 * * 0.001 0.010 6.305 193.523 
7 * * 0.025 0.010 3.579 190.742 
8  * 0.531 0.001 0.647 245.497 
9  * 0.253 0.001 1.388 245.916 
10 * * 0.009 0.001 4.533 233.295 
11 * * 0.000 0.001 8.352 208.074 
12  * 0.127 0.001 2.058 251.404 
13  * 0.155 0.001 1.870 216.825 
14 * * 0.006 0.001 4.817 205.763 
15   0.078 0.100 2.528 162.636 
16 * * 0.014 0.001 4.099 248.612 
17 * * 0.020 0.001 3.813 254.921 
18  * 0.242 0.010 1.432 190.070 
19 * * 0.000 0.001 8.461 255.906 
20 * * 0.035 0.001 3.285 216.481 
21  * 0.185 0.001 1.697 205.582 
22   0.375 0.500 0.997 120.003 
23   0.112 0.500 2.187 140.752 
24 * * 0.013 0.010 4.171 181.955 
25   0.085 0.500 2.451 154.749 
26 * * 0.012 0.001 4.246 257.106 
27 * * 0.002 0.001 5.762 244.474 
28 * * 0.000 0.001 8.822 250.487 
29 * * 0.001 0.001 6.843 244.602 
30 * * 0.031 0.001 3.396 201.711 
31 * * 0.000 0.001 7.255 202.812 
32  * 0.083 0.001 2.469 242.573 
33 * * 0.000 0.001 12.307 300.685 
34  * 0.845 0.050 0.173 173.079 
35 * * 0.007 0.001 4.698 234.866 
36 * * 0.002 0.001 5.729 245.202 
37   0.080 0.500 2.502 146.174 
38  * 0.680 0.001 0.396 208.741 
39  * 0.589 0.050 0.542 174.603 
40  * 0.116 0.001 2.153 267.530 
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Rao test  
U 
41 * * 0.000 0.001 8.986 232.536 
42 * * 0.000 0.001 11.904 277.456 
43  * 0.106 0.001 2.236 213.769 
44 * * 0.005 0.001 5.093 213.188 
45   0.642 0.500 0.454 147.183 
46 * * 0.014 0.010 4.097 195.864 
47  * 0.161 0.050 1.831 173.809 
48 * * 0.000 0.001 9.770 259.228 
49 * * 0.000 0.001 7.538 218.907 
50 * * 0.000 0.001 15.433 289.695 
51  * 0.111 0.001 2.195 203.287 
52  * 0.918 0.001 0.088 237.879 
53 * * 0.001 0.001 6.406 252.947 
54  * 0.173 0.050 1.763 179.642 
55  * 0.202 0.010 1.608 191.221 
56  * 0.249 0.001 1.402 239.678 
57  * 0.204 0.001 1.600 219.477 
58 * * 0.023 0.001 3.664 206.461 
59  * 0.862 0.050 0.153 177.881 
60  * 0.437 0.001 0.843 212.720 
61  * 0.080 0.001 2.510 226.996 
62  * 0.217 0.010 1.541 188.522 
63 * * 0.008 0.001 4.650 240.977 
64  * 0.276 0.001 1.302 250.957 
65 * * 0.017 0.001 3.959 293.582 
66  * 0.922 0.010 0.083 188.113 
67   0.542 0.500 0.626 120.362 
68 * * 0.000 0.001 9.786 259.450 
69 * * 0.000 0.001 11.174 263.524 
70   0.393 0.500 0.951 118.182 
71 * * 0.000 0.001 15.302 289.076 
72 * * 0.011 0.001 4.362 268.886 
73 * * 0.001 0.001 6.799 255.894 
74   0.115 0.100 2.154 163.870 
75 * * 0.001 0.001 6.521 219.271 
76  * 0.165 0.001 1.807 243.226 
77 * * 0.037 0.001 3.232 215.638 
78 * * 0.000 0.001 7.363 224.046 
79 * * 0.000 0.001 10.414 228.688 




Despite this rather conservative way of analyzing the data, the Raleigh test rejected the 
null hypothesis that the drag-and-clicks were uniformly distributed for 42 out of 80 shapes. 
Rao’s spacing test was significant for nearly all of the shapes, or 71 out of 80. Test statistics can 
be found in tables 3.1 and 3.2. We therefore conclude that novel, random shapes in general are 
directional. A majority of completely novel shapes has an inherent directionality, be it 
unidirectional, bidirectional, or multidirectional. Figure 3.4 shows all directional judgments from 
experiment 1, regardless of shape.  
 
 
Figure 3.4. All directional judgments. This rose plot, or angle histogram, shows people’s drag-and-clicks used for 
directional judgments in experiment 1. All drag-and-clicks are included, regardless of which shape stimuli were 
shown. The length of each bin corresponds to the percentage of drag-and-clicks that fell within the corresponding 
directions. 
Experiment 2: Forced Choice of Directionality 
Experiment 1 showed that directional judgments are non-uniform for a majority of randomly 
shaped novel objects. However, judgments also appeared to be influenced by factors that were 
independent of, or interacted with, the shape of these objects (figure 3.4). Even if the rotation of 
the shapes was randomly determined, people in general tended to favor an upward and to some 
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lesser extent a downward direction. People might have been following a heuristic akin to “when 
in doubt, an object is aligned to the axis of gravity”. The benefits of transient visual attention 
have also been documented to be greater in the upper than the lower visual hemifield 
(Kristjánsson & Sigurdardottir, 2008), and this could be a contributing factor. It is also possible 
that the response mode introduced some bias. To minimize such biases, experiment 2 involved a 
more constrained judgment about the directionality of the same shapes with a new set of 
subjects. 
The main purpose of experiment 2 was to get unbiased measurements of each shape’s 
perceived directionality so that these measures could be used as predictors of behavior in 
experiments 3-7. We also wanted to know whether we could assume that directionality was 
independent of the time of probing. Neurons within dorsal stream regions important for the 
allocation of attention and eye movements respond selectively to shapes, but these shape 
responses can change very rapidly over the course of a few hundred milliseconds (see chapter 2). 
We therefore thought it possible that the perceived direction of a shape could change very 
rapidly as well and thus we included two different stimulus onset asynchronies in this 
experiment.  
Method 
Participants. 14 new participants (9 women) completed experiment 2. They were 
between 18 and 31 years of age (M=23).  
Stimuli. The 80 shapes used in experiment 1 were also used in experiment 2. We found 
the median axis of the directional estimates gathered for each shape in experiment 1. Note that 
the axis itself has an orientation but not a direction; for example, directional judgments to the left 
and right would similarly favor a horizontal axis, and up and down directional judgments would 
count toward a vertical axis. All shapes were then rotated so that this main axis fell on the 
horizontal meridian. Clockwise or anti-clockwise rotation was chosen for each shape, whichever 
one led to a rotation of fewer degrees from the shape’s orientation in experiment 1. Each shape 
was shown in this alignment (original) or reflected across the vertical meridian (mirrored).  
Design. Each person completed 320 trials spread across five experimental blocks in a 
random order. The 80 shapes were shown four times each, twice in the original alignment and 
twice mirrored to ensure that any possible left-right biases would not systematically influence 
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people’s directional judgments. Each shape was followed by two peripheral disks with a 150 ms 
or 300 ms stimulus onset asynchrony (80 shapes x 2 alignments x 2 SOAs). 
Procedure. The behavioral task from experiment 2 can be seen in figure 3.5. People were 
asked to look to the center of the screen at the start of each trial. A white shape (diameter 
approximately 4°) appeared on a black background in the center of the screen followed by the 
onset of two gray disks (diameter 2°), one on the left and the other on the right side of the screen 
(8° eccentricity). The shape and the disks stayed on the screen until the person responded.  
 
 
Figure 3.5. Task in experiments 2 and 3. In experiment 2, a central shape was shown, followed by the appearance 
of two peripheral disks. Participants indicated whether the shape pointed or directed them to the left or right disk by 
pressing one of two response buttons. These judgments were used as indicators of each shape’s directionality. In 
experiment 3, a shape was followed by the display of only a single disk which could appear with equal likelihood in 
a direction congruent or incongruent with the shape’s inherent directionality. Subjects indicated which side of the 
screen the disk appeared on by pressing the appropriate button. An example congruent disk is marked here with a 




Participants held a button box with both hands. They were instructed to push the left 
button if they thought a shape pointed or directed them to the left dot, and push the right button if 
they thought a shape pointed or directed them to the right dot. They were told to respond as soon 
as the dots appeared and were informed that there were no correct or incorrect responses for any 
of the shapes. Each person completed a short practice session with separate shapes.  
Results 
For each stimulus onset asynchrony (150 ms and 300 ms), we calculated a measure of a 
shape’s directionality. We did so by determining whether a shape and its mirror image were 
reported to have opposite directionality. If they did, the participant was said to have determined 
that a shape had a particular directionality which we arbitrarily call positive and negative 
(positive: original shape pointed left, mirror image right; negative: vice versa). We then counted 
the number of participants that indicated that a particular shape had a positive directionality, 
subtracted the number of participants that reported that the shape had a negative directionality, 
and divided the difference by the total number of participants. This measure of directionality can 
theoretically range from -1 (all participants indicate a negative directionality) to 1 (all 
participants indicate a positive directionality).  
As can be seen in figure 3.6, there is a high correlation between the directionality of the 
shapes at the two stimulus onset asynchronies (r(78)=0.91, p=3.9x10
-32
) and the regression line 
passes through the origin (y-intercept is not statistically different from 0, p=0.475). Therefore, a 
shape’s directionality appears to be unaffected by the time of probing. The high correlation 
between the two measures indicates that they are capturing the same construct (i.e. directionality) 
with some added noise.  
We therefore combined the measures by taking their average. The measure’s sign was 
used in all following experiments as a binary statistic indicating each shape’s directionality, i.e. 
was a shape deemed to be leftward or rightward in its original position? The measure’s absolute 
value was used in a cross-experiments analysis as an indicator of directionality strength or 
consensus (see Individual Item Analysis).  
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A two-factor ANOVA with directionality strength as a dependent measure did not reveal 
any significant effects of either the complexity of the shapes (whether their polygons were made 
by fitting a spline to 8 or 16 coordinates) or whether they were symmetric or asymmetric (main 
effect of complexity: F(1,76) =  2.860, p = 0.095; main effect of symmetry: F(1,76) = 1.730, p = 
0.192; interaction: F(1,76) = 0.022, p = 0.882). 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Directionality of novel shapes. Each novel shape’s directionality is indicated by a marker. Symmetrical 
shapes are marked with a light gray diamond, and asymmetrical shapes with a dark gray circle. A diamond 
embedded in a circle is a marker for two different shapes, one symmetrical and the other asymmetrical. A circle 
marked with a dot represents two asymmetrical shapes. Directionality can theoretically range from -1 (everyone 
judges a shape to have negative directionality) to 1 (everyone judges a shape to have positive directionality). 
Directionality judgments were highly similar at two stimulus onset asynchronies. For details, see Experiment 2: 




Experiment 3: Shape-Induced Covert Visual Orienting of Attention 
Our claim is that the capability of biasing orienting is a general property of shape, even 
without explicit training or learning, instead of being limited to a select few over-learned objects. 
In experiment 3, we therefore used several novel shapes and asked if they automatically pushed 
visual attention in a particular direction. We would reach this conclusion if people were faster at 
detecting visual targets when novel shapes pointed to their location even though targets were no 
more likely to appear there than they were to appear in the opposite direction. We additionally 
wanted to see whether these effects were time-sensitive. We expected the shape of the objects to 
rapidly and automatically lead to the formation of an initial hypothesis of where to pay attention, 
soon to be rejected because relying on the shapes’ directionality was maladaptive for 
performance in the task. We therefore expected a rapid waxing and waning of the effects of 
shape-derived directionality on the allocation of spatial attention akin to the time course of 
transient visual attention (see e.g. Nakayama & Mackeben, 1989). 
Method 
Participants. Subjects were 20 people (12 women), ages 18 to 28 (M=21).  
Stimuli. 40 out of 80 shapes used in experiment 2 were used as stimuli in experiment 3. 
The shapes with the strongest directionality, as determined by responses in experiment 2, were 
used with the constraints that the proportions of shape types (symmetric or asymmetric, 
generated from 8 or 16 coordinate polygons) were the same as in the original shape set. Stimuli 
were displayed as described for experiment 2. 
Design. Each person completed 960 trials in a random order. The trials were spread over 
10 blocks and were completed in a single day. Each shape was shown equally often in its original 
alignment and mirrored (see experiment 2). A disk target followed the shape onset with a 
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 0 ms, 50 ms, 100 ms, 150 ms, 300 ms, or 500 ms. The 
design was fully crossed (40 shapes x 2 polarities x 2 disk locations x 6 SOAs) so the shapes 
predicted neither where nor when a target would appear. 
Procedure. Eye position was monitored with an EyeLink 1000 eye tracker (SR 
Research). Participants had to maintain fixation within 0.65 degrees of the center throughout 
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each experimental trial, otherwise it would abort. Participants held a response button box with 
both hands. A shape was displayed in the center. A single gray disk target (diameter 2°) appeared 
with a variable time delay on the horizontal meridian, either on the left or the right side of the 
screen at an eccentricity of 8°. Shapes did not predict either where or when a target would 
appear. The task is depicted in figure 3.5. 
People were instructed to press the left button if this target appeared on the left and press 
the right button if it appeared on the right. They were asked to do this as fast as they could while 
keeping their responses nearly 100% correct. Before data collection began, participants 
completed a short practice session with a circular shape.  
It should be noted that data from a secondary task were collected from participants in 
experiment 3. This secondary task was a replication of experiment 2 except that the stimulus 
onset asynchrony (SOA) was fixed at 150 ms. Before their main session (procedure described 
above), participants judged the directionality of those 40 out of the original 80 shapes that were 
not used as stimuli in experiment 3. After their main session, participants judged the 
directionality of the 40 remaining shapes that were used as stimuli in experiment 3. The data 
from the secondary task were not used since responses in experiment 3 could be sufficiently 
predicted based on data collected from an independent group of people who participated in 
experiment 2, as described in the Results below.  
Results 
Overall accuracy ranged from 92-100%. Accuracy was slightly, but significantly, greater 
on congruent (M=98.2%) than incongruent trials (M=97.7%, paired samples t-test, t(19) = 2.301, 
p=0.033, d=0.51). A trial was considered congruent if a central shape pointed in the direction of 
a peripheral target, as determined by an independent sample of participants in experiment 2, and 
incongruent if the shape pointed in the opposite direction. We looked at effects on response times 
for correct trials only. 
13 people completed all 960 trials with full eye tracking. Seven people either did not 
complete all trials, or completed all trials but we were unable to track their eyes for the whole 
duration of the experiment. The results for these two groups were qualitatively similar, and 
similar conclusions would be drawn from statistical analysis on their data. We therefore included 
data from all subjects in an ANOVA with response time as a dependent measure and two 
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repeated factors, congruency and stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA, the time between the onset of 
the shape and the target). Response time was considered to be the time between target onset and 
manual response.  
People were significantly faster when the shapes’ directionality was congruent with the 




=0.54). The mean response time also 





=0.80). The interaction between congruency and stimulus onset 
asynchrony was only marginally significant (F(5,95)=1.967, p=0.090). Joint tests of the effects 
of congruency within each level of stimulus onset asynchrony showed that 50 ms was the earliest 
SOA at which congruency had a significant effect on response time (F(1, 95)=21.32, p=1.5x10
-5, 
Bonferroni corrected threshold for significance: 0.008, d=0.99). 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Shape-induced orienting of attention. Mean response times (RT) from experiment 3 are shown as a 
function of stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) and whether the location of a target was congruent or incongruent with 
the inherent directionality of a non-predictive central shape cue.  
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All participants in experiment 3 were right handed. It is conceivable that congruency 
effects were mainly driven by trials when the target was on the right and the participants thus 
responded with their dominant hand. Using only correct trials, we therefore performed another 
ANOVA with response time as a dependent measure and three repeated factors: Congruency, 










=0.80), and target position (F(1,19)=5.26, p=0.033, ηp
2
=0.22) were all significant, as was the 





were faster on congruent trials, they got faster as SOA increased, they were faster for left than 
for right targets, and this difference for left and right targets decreased with longer SOAs. There 
was, however, no significant interaction between congruency and target location (F(1,19)=0.04, 
p=0.85), nor a significant three-way interaction of congruency, SOA, and target location 
(F(5,95)=1.03, p=0.41). The congruency effect does therefore not appear to depend on the 
target’s position or the hand used to report it. 
Interestingly, there was enough variability explained by target location that when it was 
included as a factor in the ANOVA, a significant interaction between congruency and SOA was 
revealed (F(5,95)=2.41 , p=0.042, ηp
2
=0.11). The dependency of the congruency effect on SOA 
was close to but not exactly as expected. We had hypothesized that the congruency effects would 
have a sharp monotonous increase followed by a decrease. Instead, the congruency effects 
appeared to peak twice, once at the 50 ms SOA and again at the 150 ms SOA. Although 
surprising, two peaks at approximately those same time points have been reported before for 
transient visual attention (Nakayama & Mackeben, 1989, see e.g. their fig. 7). We will leave it to 
future studies to find out whether there might be two processes underlying the effects we see 
here. 
 To summarize, people in general are both faster and more accurate at detecting a single 
target if its location is congruent with the directionality of a non-predictive central shape cue. 
The congruency effects vary with stimulus onset asynchrony, and are apparent very early on, as 




Experiment 4: Overcoming Shape-Induced Biases 
Experiment 3 showed that the shape of an object rapidly and automatically pushes covert 
attention in a particular direction. How easily can this bias be overcome? Experiment 3 was 
deliberately set up to have no cue-target contingencies, making the shape useless with regard to 
the subjects’ detection task. In experiment 4, all shapes provided accurate information about the 
location of an upcoming target. However, some cue-target contingencies were in accordance 
with the shape’s directionality while others conflicted with it. Would experience with these cue-
target contingencies make people overcome their initial shape-induced biases?  
We designed a task where a target always appeared in the location to which some shapes 
pointed, while for other shapes it always appeared in the location that they pointed away from. If 
people are consistently faster at finding the target in the former case than in the latter, even 
though all shape cues are informative, we would conclude that a shape’s directionality influences 
behavior not only in a situation when there is nothing else to go on, but also comes into play 
even when other, more accurate information is available. 
Method 
Participants. 16 people (6 women) between the ages of 18 and 30 (M=22) participated.  
Stimuli. Eight simple asymmetric shapes were used as central precues in a visual search 
task. The shapes were black, had the same area, and had an approximate diameter of 3°. The 
shapes’ directionality had previously been determined in experiment 2. 
 People searched for a target cross among distractor plus signs. Distractors were made by 
overlaying a vertical and a horizontal bar (1.1° x 0.3° each). The target was made in the same 
way except that one bar was vertically displaced by 0.2°. The search stimuli were then given a 
random rotation on each trial. The search stimuli were black, except that a small colored circle 
(diameter 0.1°) was embedded in each of them. The target’s circle color could be red or green 
and was chosen at random. The color of each distractor’s circle was also randomly determined to 
be red or green with the constraint that there was at least one distractor disk of each color. 
Design. Two sets of four shapes were used in this experiment. Half of the participants 
were given one set and half were given the other set. Each shape served as a predictive central 
precue in a visual search task. It cued one of four possible target locations (upper left, upper 
right, bottom left, or bottom right).  
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Two shapes were congruent, meaning that the shapes’ inherent directionality was 
consistent with the direction of the target location that it cued. The other two were incongruent; 
they cued a target location in a direction opposite that of their inherent directionality. The two 
congruent shapes cued target locations on one diagonal and the two incongruent shapes cued 
target locations on the other diagonal (figure 3.8). The rotation of each shape was the same 
across all participants with the same shape set but the cue-target contingencies differed; each 




Figure 3.8. Task in experiment 4. A central shape validly cued the location of a peripheral target cross shown 
among distractor plus signs. Participants had to find the cross and report its central color. While all shapes provided 
accurate information about the upcoming target location, the cued location was congruent with the directionality of 
half of the shapes but incongruent for the other half. Examples of congruent and incongruent search trials are shown. 
Cued locations are indicated by yellow dotted circles. The locations pointed to and away from are indicated by blue 
and red dotted circles, respectively. No dotted circles were actually shown to the participants. 
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Central shape cues therefore predicted, with 100% accuracy, where peripheral targets 
would appear. The correctly predicted location could be congruent or incongruent with the 
shape’s inherent directionality. Each participant completed 240 search trials spread over four 
blocks during a single session. 
 Procedure. Eye position was monitored using an EyeLink 1000 eye tracker (SR 
Research). The participant’s gaze on a central 0.3° x 0.3° fixation square triggered the start of 
each search trial; she was then free to move her eyes for the remainder of the trial. The fixation 
square was replaced by a predictive central shape cue which was visible throughout the trial. The 
participant was told that a shape would appear on the screen after she had acquired fixation, and 
that after the shape appeared a search array would show up on the screen. After 500 ms, a square 
search array with three distractors and one target appeared around the central shape. The search 
stimuli were all shown at 11° eccentricity. The participant had to find the target and report the 
color (red or green) of an embedded disk by pushing the button of the corresponding color on her 
response box. This completely disambiguated the manual response from the directionality of the 
shape. The procedure is depicted in figure 3.8.  
Participants were instructed to respond quickly but to try to maintain near perfect 
performance. Auditory feedback was given to indicate whether a response was correct or 
incorrect.  
Results 
Mean accuracy ranged from 92% to 98%. People were significantly more accurate at 
judging the color of a disk embedded in a target if the target was preceded by a shape cue whose 
directionality was congruent (M=96.2%) rather than incongruent (M=94.8%) with the target’s 
location (paired samples t-test, t(15)=3.257, p=0.005, d=0.81). Error trials were not further 
analyzed. 
Mean response time was used as a dependent measure in a repeated measures ANOVA 





=0.39) and congruency (F(1,15)=15.05, p=0.001, ηp
2
=0.50) were significant, but the 
interaction between the two factors was not significant (F(3,45)=0.98, p=0.409). Overall, 
response times decreased over the course of the experiment. Subjects were also faster at 
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reporting the attributes of a peripheral target when it was in a location congruent with a central 
shape cue’s directionality. This effect did not seem to diminish over the course of the experiment 
(see figure 3.9).  
Because congruent and incongruent shapes were equally predictive of where a target 
would appear, one might have expected that the performance gap between congruent and 
incongruent shapes would narrow as people gained more experience with the cue-target 
contingencies. Although this might potentially happen with longer training, we saw no sign of it 
and the benefit for congruent shape cues persisted. It thus appears that people intuitively make 




Figure 3.9. Congruency effects over the course of learning. Mean response times (RT) are shown for 
experimental blocks in experiment 4. A central shape cue predicted, with 100% accuracy, where a peripheral target 
would appear. The correctly predicted location could be congruent or incongruent with the shape’s inherent 
directionality.   
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Experiment 5: Shape as a Movement Cue 
So far we have shown that the shape of an object is used to rapidly and automatically 
extract its directionality, and that this in turn guides both overt and covert visual orienting. An 
unanswered question is why the visual system is set up this way at all. One possible reason is that 
the shape of an object restricts and thus predicts its movements. A snapshot of the shape of an 
object might therefore provide valuable information about where it may be moments later. The 
rules governing selective sampling of the environment should incorporate any available data, 
including shape, which provides prior information about where important things are going to be 
in the near future. Informal self-reports of participants in experiments 1 and 2 also indicated that 
judgments about the directionality of shapes could be related to people’s perceptions about 
where the things were moving or heading. In experiment 5, we directly examined whether the 
shape-defined directionality of an object was integrated into calculations about its movement. 
We would reach this conclusion if people were consistently faster at judging where an object was 
heading if its direction of motion was congruent with the directionality derived from the object’s 
shape. 
Method 
Participants. 16 people (7 women) of ages 18-54 (M=27) participated in the experiment.  
Stimuli. Stimuli were the same 40 shapes used in experiment 3. The shapes were white 
and shown on a black background. Each shape extended approximately 1°.  
Design. Each person completed 320 experimental trials in two blocks within a single 
session. All shapes were shown four times within each block in a random order (40 shapes x 2 
shape directionalities x 2 movement directions x 2 repetitions).  
Procedure. The participant was instructed to look at a fixation disk (white 0.5° diameter) 
at the beginning of each trial. She was otherwise free to move her eyes. The fixation disk stayed 
onscreen for 510 ms, and 470 ms later, participants then saw multiple copies of a particular shape 
lined up in a row across the screen (figure 3.10). The screen center coincided with the pivot point 
of the central shape (see experiment 1). The distance between corresponding points of juxtaposed 
copies of the shape was 2.4°. To create a moving stimulus, the row of shapes was translated 0.8° 
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to either the left or right every 130 ms. On any given trial, the row of shapes therefore appeared 
to be moving either leftward or rightward.  
Shapes were shown equally often pointing to the left or the right; this directionality was 
defined by an independent sample of people (see experiment 2). The shapes pointed in the 
direction of motion on half of the trials, and pointed the opposite way on half of the trials. Shape 
was not a valid predictor of motion.  
 
 
Figure 3.10. Example motion stimuli. To create a moving stimulus in experiments 5, 6, and 7, a row of shapes was 
translated in a direction that was either congruent or incongruent with the shapes’ inherent directionality. The 
direction to which the example shapes are most often judged to point is indicated by a black vertical bar, and the 
opposite direction is indicated by a gray vertical bar. 
 
Participants held a response button box with both hands and were told to press the left 
button if the shapes were moving to the left, and press the right button if they were moving to the 
right. A tone sounded when the participant responded. No specific feedback was provided about 




Mean accuracy ranged from 89-99%. Although accuracy was generally very high, people 
were significantly more accurate at judging where the shapes were going when the shapes 
pointed in the direction to which they were moving (congruent: M=97.9%, incongruent: 
M=95.0%, paired samples t-test, t(15)=4.408, p=0.001, d=1.10).  
 
 
Figure 3.11. Shape as a movement cue. Mean response times (RT) are shown as a function of congruency between 
shape-derived directionality and direction of motion. When an object moved in the direction to which it pointed, 
people were faster at judging its direction of motion (Experiment 5: Motion direction), matching its motion to the 
motion of other objects (Experiment 6: Motion matching), and following it with their eyes (experiment 7: Ocular 
pursuit). Note that confidence intervals are small. 
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We calculated the mean response times for correct trials only. Response times were 
defined with respect to motion onset, which was the time of the first translation of the multi-
shape stimulus. All participants were faster at judging where the shapes were going if their 
movement direction was congruent with their inherent directionality (figure 3.11). This effect 




Experiment 6: Match to Motion 
The results from experiment 5 were quite robust; every participant was faster at judging 
where a shape was going if it pointed in the direction of motion. We interpret this as evidence for 
the idea that the shape of an object, in particular its shape-derived directionality, is automatically 
integrated into movement calculations.  
In experiment 6, we wanted to address two alternative interpretations. First, we wanted to 
rule out the possibility that any slight pixel-by-pixel differences between leftward and rightward 
shapes solely determined an object’s supposed directionality and its behavioral effects. Secondly, 
it is possible that we were not seeing an effect on motion perception but rather a type of effector 
priming; certain shape features might afford being grasped by a particular hand, and a button 
press with that hand might thus become potentiated. The stimuli in experiment 5 were all very 
small 2D silhouettes that, if perceived as graspable at all, probably all afforded a similar pincer 
grip; nonetheless, we wanted to rule out this explanation.  
To address these possibilities, we designed an experiment where moving shapes had a 
random starting position, and where manual responses were neither directly related to the 
direction of motion nor to the directionality of shapes. If people are still faster at judging the 
direction of motion of an object when it is congruent with the directionality derived from its 
shape, we would conclude that these alternative interpretations do not sufficiently account for 
our effects and that, instead, shape-derived directionality is integrated into the calculations of an 




Participants. 16 people (8 women) of ages 18 to 34 (M=22) took part in this experiment. 
One additional participant was excluded because of very low accuracy rate (more than six 
standard deviations below the mean). 
Stimuli. Shape stimuli were as described for Experiment 5 with the addition of a white 
disk shape (diameter 0.9°).  
Design. Participants completed 320 trials each in four blocks within one session. Trials 
were shown in a pseudo-random order. The design was fully crossed (40 shapes x 2 polarities x 2 
shape movement directions x 2 disk movement directions).  
Procedure. Procedure was as described for experiment 5 with the following changes. 
Presentation of a central fixation spot was followed by the appearance of several disk shapes that 
extended to the screen’s edges. The horizontal starting position of the disks was random but the 
distance between the centers of adjacent disks was fixed at 2.4°. All disk shapes were translated 
0.8° degrees every 130 ms so that they appeared to move either leftward or rightward. The disks 
disappeared 390 ms after their initial onset. After a 500 ms inter-stimulus interval, participants 
saw multiple copies of a particular novel shape. Their horizontal starting position was random 
but the distance between corresponding points on two adjacent shapes was always 2.4°. The 
shapes could point leftward or rightward, and could move leftward or rightward, as detailed in 
experiment 5 (see also figure 3.10). 
Participants indicated whether each novel shape was moving in the same direction as the 
disks (match) or in a direction opposite that of the disks (non-match). Participants responded 
with their right hand using a two-button box. The button box was aligned so that one button was 
nearer the person and the other was farther away. Half of the participants pushed the closer 
button to indicate a match and the button farther away to indicate a non-match, and vice versa for 
the other half of the participants. Participants completed some practice trials with other shapes 
randomly picked from the rest of the original shape dataset used in experiment 2.  
Results 
Mean accuracy ranged from 84-100%. Participants were on average more accurate on trials 
where the shape’s directionality was congruent with the shape’s own direction of motion; this 
difference did not reach statistical significance (congruent: M=95.6%, incongruent: M=94.1%, 
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paired samples t-test, t(15)=1.676, p=0.114). Error trials were not analyzed further.  
Response times were defined as the time between the novel objects’ motion onset and 
button press. People were significantly faster when novel shapes pointed in the direction to 
which they were moving (congruent: M=542 ms; incongruent: M=567 ms; paired samples t-test, 
t(15)=7.244, p=3x10
-6
, d=1.81, figure 3.11).  
We regressed the objects’ starting position against response time. By starting position we 
refer to the location of the pivot point (see experiment 1) of the central shape in the first frame 
relative to the direction of motion; for example, if the pivot is 1° to the right of the screen center, 
but the shape is moving leftward, then the shape’s starting position is considered to be -1° 
relative to the motion direction. For each participant, we calculated the slope of the best fitting 
line (least squares method) and did so separately for congruent and incongruent trials. The 
participants’ mean slopes for congruent (M=0 ms) and incongruent trials (M=7 ms) were neither 
significantly different from zero (single-sample t-test; congruent trials: t(15)=0.116, p=0.909; 
incongruent trials: t(15)=1.561, p=0.139), nor were they significantly different from each other 
(paired-samples t-test; t(15)=0.977, p=0.344). Starting position was not found to be a significant 
factor contributing to response times in this task. 
People are therefore faster at judging the direction of movement of an object if its shape 
is congruent with the object’s motion path. This cannot be attributed solely to pixel-by-pixel 
differences between leftward- and rightward-pointing objects because their starting position was 
randomly varied. The effect cannot be attributed to effector priming either; the effect was found 
even though people used one hand only and the button presses were orthogonal to the objects’ 
direction of motion and shape-derived directionality. 
Experiment 7: Shape Effects in Oculomotor Programming 
Experiments 5 and 6 showed that shape can play a significant role in motion perception. 
However, we are especially interested in the contribution that shape information can make to 
action guidance, in particular oculomotor guidance, considering that shape selectivity has been 
found in important oculomotor centers of the brain (Janssen et al., 2008; Konen & Kastner, 2008; 
Lehky & Sereno, 2007; Peng, Sereno, Silva, Lehky, & Sereno, 2008; A. B. Sereno & Maunsell, 
1998; M. E. Sereno et al., 2002). Given the numerous dissociations between perception and 
action (Goodale, 2008; Goodale & Milner, 1992; Milner & Goodale, 1995, 2010), including 
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oculomotor behavior (Mack, Fendrich, Chambers, & Heuer, 1985; Spering & Gegenfurtner, 
2008; Spering & Montagnini, 2011; Wong & Mack, 1981), we thought it important to test 
whether shape affects the programming of eye movements in addition to perception. 
Additionally, we wished to compare the effects of novel random shapes with those of arrows, 
which are both familiar and highly directional, and with filled circles, which should be 
adirectional, to see whether shape-derived directionality mainly helps or hinders performance 
relative to situations in which no bias should be present. People were asked to follow a row of 
moving shapes with their eyes. They were free to use both saccadic and smooth eye movements 
for this ocular pursuit task. We expected eye movements in the direction to which the shapes 
were pointing to be facilitated, and eye movements in the opposite direction to be hindered. 
Method 
Participants. 16 people participated (7 women). Their age ranged from 18 to 24 (M=21). 
Stimuli. We used 40 novel shapes, as described for experiment 5, and four additional 
shapes: three differently shaped arrows and a filled circle. All shapes, including the arrows and 
the circle, had the same area and an approximate diameter of 1°. 
Design. Each person completed two experimental blocks for a total of 184 trials in 
random order. All directional shapes (40 novel shapes, 3 arrows) were shown 4 times each (2 
motion directions x 2 shape directionalities). Circular shapes were shown on control trials (2 
motion directions x 3 repetitions). 
Procedure. The experimental procedure was as described for experiment 5 (see also 
figure 3.10) with the following changes. At the beginning of each trial, the screen center always 
coincided with the center of area of the central shape in each multi-shape stimulus. People were 
told to follow the shapes’ movement (leftward or rightward) with their eyes. Eye position was 
tracked; a trial started once a person had acquired fixation on a central fixation spot. Instead of 
responding to the direction of motion with a button press, the trial ended once people’s eyes 
reached one of two invisible circular regions, a target region in the direction of motion (correct 
response) or a distractor region in a direction opposite that of the real motion of the shapes 
(incorrect response). The circular regions were centered on the horizontal meridian at 6.0° 
eccentricity with a radius of 3.0°. Trials were considered valid if the subjects’ horizontal eye 
position within the first 130 ms after stimulus onset was no further than 0.65° from the screen’s 
 104 
center, and vertical eye position was no further than 1.0° from the horizontal meridian 
throughout the trial. Furthermore, trials were considered valid only if people reached one of the 
circular regions within 2000 ms of motion onset. On average, 79.2% of trials were deemed valid 
and we base our analysis on these valid trials only. 
Results 
Participant’s mean accuracy for novel shapes ranged from 62% to 100%. This great range 
of performance was surprising since the task was mainly designed to measure response time and 
not accuracy levels. Accordingly, here we saw a much greater difference between the accuracy in 
congruent (M=92.9%) and incongruent (M=84.2%) novel shape trials than in our previous 
experiments where accuracy was closer to ceiling. People were significantly more accurate on 
congruent than incongruent novel shape trials (paired samples t-test, t(15)=3.865, p=0.002, 
d=0.97). Response times were calculated relative to motion onset on correct trials only. People 
were significantly faster at reaching the target region, located in the direction of motion, if the 
novel shapes’ inherent directionality was congruent with the direction of motion (congruent: 
M=267 ms, incongruent: M=291 ms, paired samples t-test, t(15)=5.719, p=4.1x10
-5
, d=1.43, 
figure 3.11). We note that the effect of congruency on both accuracy and response time remains 
significant even when invalid trials are included in the analysis. 
We compared the effects of novel shapes with the effects of arrows. People were far more 
accurate when the arrows pointed in the direction of motion than if they pointed in the opposite 
direction (congruent: M=100.0%, incongruent: M=53.0%, paired samples t-test, t(15)=9.918, 
p=5.6x10
-8
, d=2.48) and almost twice as fast (congruent: M=240 ms, incongruent: M=405 ms, 
paired samples t-test, t(14)=5.231, p=1.3x10
-4
, d=1.35; one person had no correct incongruent 
trials and was therefore not included in the RT measures). People were also significantly faster 
and more accurate for congruent arrows than they were for congruent novel shapes, and they 
were significantly slower and less accurate for incongruent arrows than they were for 
incongruent novel shapes (paired samples t-tests, all ps<0.003, all ds > 0.96). As expected, 
arrows are therefore particularly effective stimuli for orienting guidance.  
Finally, we compared novel shapes to filled circles (which have no directionality). The 
mean accuracy (M=88.9%) and response times (278 ms) for circles fell half-way in between 
those of congruent and incongruent novel shapes. The differences in accuracy for circles and 
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congruent shapes were not reliably smaller or larger than the differences in accuracy for circles 
and incongruent shapes (t(15)=0.221, p=0.828). Response time differences for circles and 
congruent shapes were not reliably smaller or larger than those for circles and incongruent 
shapes (t(15)=0.129, p=0.899). The effects of directionality therefore appear to be more or less 
symmetrical; the more congruent a shape’s directionality is with the direction of motion, the 
faster and more accurate the oculomotor behavior, and the more incongruent a shape’s 
directionality, the slower and more error-prone is the behavior. Shape-derived directionality 
appears to be a strong enough motion cue that the stimuli can be perceived to move, and are thus 
initially pursued, in the direction opposite that of the “real” motion. Overall, our results support 
the hypothesis that novel shapes have an automatic effect on oculomotor programming. 
Individual Item Analysis 
The possibility remained that our results were driven only by a few atypical novel shapes, 
with the rest of them contributing nothing to the effects. For example, it was possible that by 
random chance, a few of our shapes looked like arrows and that these atypical shapes were the 
sole driving force behind our results. To rule out this possibility, we analyzed congruency effects 
for individual shapes. We did so with data collected for novel shapes in experiment 3 (detection), 
experiment 5 (motion direction), experiment 6 (motion matching), and experiment 7 (ocular 
pursuit).  
For experiments 3, 5, and 6, we calculated the mean response time on incongruent and 
congruent trials for each shape for each participant, calculated response time savings by 
subtracting the former from the latter, and finally found the mean response time savings for each 
shape across participants within a particular experiment. We included all trials regardless of 
people’s responses to get adequate sampling of responses to each shape. Data from one 
participant in experiment 3 was excluded because she did not complete both congruent and 
incongruent trials for all of the shapes.  
For experiment 7, most subjects had at least one shape with either no valid congruent 
trials or no valid incongruent trials; we therefore collapsed across subjects and calculated mean 
response times savings for each novel shape. Collapsing across subjects allowed us to include 
only correct trials for response time calculations and still retain enough trials for each of the 
novel shapes. Accuracy had a much greater range in experiment 7 than in our other experiments, 
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providing us with the opportunity of also looking at accuracy savings found by subtracting the 




Figure 3.12. Congruency effect correlation matrix. This matrix shows the relationship between directionality 
strength (experiment E2) and savings measures from various tasks (experiments E3, E5, E6, and E7, summarized in 
Individual Item Analysis). Numbers indicate Pearson’s r. Ellipses are the contours of a bivariate normal distribution 




The response time savings for the 40 novel shapes were positively correlated across all 
four tasks (figure 3.12). Accuracy savings in the ocular pursuit task (experiment 7) were also 
positively correlated with response time savings from all four tasks (figure 3.12). Assuming that 
any one measure is a somewhat noisy estimate of the same construct, that is to say the strength of 
a shape-derived directional bias, we combined all five measures into a single measure of an 
overall congruency advantage. We did so by dividing each original savings measure by its 
standard deviation and then took the average for each shape across the five scaled measures.  
The five original measures of savings were positively correlated with directionality 
strength as defined by the degree of consensus reached on the directionality of shapes in 
experiment 2 (figure 3.12). The overall congruency advantage scores were also significantly 
correlated with directionality strength (r(38)=0.489, p=0.001). As can be seen in figure 3.13, the 
behavioral effects were not due to a few outlier shapes; instead they were graded and related to 
the shapes’ directionality strength. Regressing directionality strength against the congruency 
measure also revealed that the y-intercept (congruency advantage: -0.260) was not significantly 
different from 0 (p=0.423), indicating, unsurprisingly but reassuringly, that an adirectional shape 
would be expected to induce no directional behavioral bias. 
The analysis of individual novel shapes shows that the stronger the directionality of a 
shape, the greater its behavioral biasing effects will, in general, be. This analysis also shows that 
our results were not driven by few very atypical shapes. Instead, congruency effects were found 
for a great number of shapes across various tasks. We find it parsimonious to conclude that the 
effects are not solely explained by resemblance to specialized stimuli such as arrows, but that the 
visual system instead automatically assigns directionality to many different shapes, and that this 




Figure 3.13. Behavioral effects of individual shapes. Each marker is in the shape of the corresponding novel 
object shown in experiments E3, E5, E6, and E7. Asymmetric shapes are shown in black, and symmetric shapes are 
shown in gray. All shapes are shown pointing to the right, as judged by participants in experiment E2. Overall, the 
stronger the consensus is on a shape’s directionality, the greater the behavioral advantage is on congruent relative to 




We hypothesized that the visual system uses information about shape to swiftly and 
automatically extract the directionality of virtually any object without explicit training or 
learning. We explored this idea in several related experiments. A majority of randomly generated 
novel shapes were reliably judged to have one or more main directions (experiments 1, 2). This 
inherent shape-derived directionality was found to automatically guide both overt (experiment 3) 
and covert (experiments 4, 7) visual orienting of attention. The effect was rapid (experiment 3), 
resistant to experience (experiment 4), and was integrated into the assessment of an object’s 
movement (experiments 5, 6, 7).  
Our results show that an object can rapidly and automatically push attention away from 
itself due to its shape. This appears to be the rule and not the exception. These biasing effects are 
likely to be direct instead of coming about through explicit interpretation or semantics; our 
objects were not symbolic, they were novel and meaningless. These orienting shifts do not need 
to be explicitly learned or trained. They are not easily overridden or overwritten by experience, 
persist even when they are not useful, and are found in various tasks and situations. 
The fact that our effects arise without any particular training does not necessarily indicate 
that experience has no role in establishing them in the first place. Indeed, previously adirectional 
and non-spatial visual stimuli such as color patches can start to automatically bias covert (Dodd 
& Wilson, 2009) and overt (Van der Stigchel, Mills, & Dodd, 2010) visual orienting once they 
have often been paired with a behaviorally relevant thing or action in a particular direction. The 
same is true for Arabic numerals where low numbers shift overt and covert visual attention to the 
left while high numbers shift it to the right (Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993; Fischer et al., 
2003; Fischer, Warlop, Hill, & Fias, 2004). While there might indeed be a true, spatial mental 
number line (Dehaene, Izard, Spelke, & Pica, 2008; Zorzi, Priftis, & Umilta, 2002), the 
associations between directions and these particular shapes are presumably relatively arbitrary 
and might come about through the cultural tradition of reading from left to right, and thus 
shifting your eyes and attention in the same direction (Dehaene et al., 1993; Shaki & Fischer, 
2008).  
The time course of learned, arbitrary visual orienting appears to be relatively slow 
(Fischer et al., 2003; Van der Stigchel et al., 2010) compared to the rapid effects found for novel 
shapes in the current study. The shape-induced biases we see arise so early that they are 
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presumably not dependent on recurrent feedback but likely arise from an initial bottom-up sweep 
of visual information. The difference might be that, unlike color patches or digits, the mapping 
from shape to space is not arbitrary. Colors are non-spatial and digits do not line up on any 
obvious spatial dimension; the shape of digits, presumably, changes completely arbitrarily going 
from 0 to 9. On the other hand, the directionality of a shape might lie on a dimension in a yet 
unknown multidimensional shape space.  
Precisely documenting this shape space is beyond the scope of this paper. After 
participation in experiments 1 and 2, we nonetheless asked people whether they thought they had 
used a particular strategy or rule to complete the tasks. We summarize these informal self-reports 
with the hope that it will help generate hypotheses for future experiments that parametrically 
vary stimulus properties to address what, exactly, determines the direction of a given shape.  
Several different strategies were reported. Often people reported using some geometric 
properties of the shapes: Direction of a large, long, tapered, or sharp protrusion, overall taper of 
shape, direction of the average of more than one protrusion, direction opposite a small protrusion 
and between two cupping protrusions, direction toward the meeting point of two tilted lines. 
Some reported taking into account a center of mass, like they were weighing the object, or 
dividing the shape into subparts and going with the direction of the part with the greatest mass or 
area. Some reported taking into account a general axis or an axis of symmetry. Some reported 
ignoring small protrusions. Some said that they had trouble judging the directionality of shapes 
that were blob-like or smoothly curved.  
When asked, many noted that at least some of the shapes resembled real things, such as 
arrows, planes or flowers, but in particular animate things such as bugs, marine life, birds, space 
aliens, or parts of animate things such as faces, heads, mouths, antennae, tails, legs, hands and 
fingers. Some reported that they tended to go with the direction in which the shapes appeared to 
be moving or heading, or where they were facing, especially if the shapes appeared to be 
biological. Judgments of the shapes’ animacy do nonetheless appear to be unrelated to the 
strength of their directionality; novel shapes that are deemed to look like some kind of existing or 
hypothetical creature, animal, or person, are not any more or less likely to have a strong 
directionality (H. M. Sigurdardottir, M. M. Shnayder, & D. L. Sheinberg, unpublished 
observations). Finally, some participants just reported that they did whatever felt right and that 
they were not consciously using any particular strategy.  
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In short, people seem to use various properties of objects to judge their directionality. 
Strategies span from taking into account particular features of the object’s parts to using 
summary statistics of the whole shape to noting body structure and plausible movement patterns. 
The fact that people report so many different strategies or even no strategy at all suggests that 
several different form or shape characteristics might all come together to influence the judged 
directionality of an object, and that people might not necessarily have conscious access to the 
rules that they use to make such judgments. The algorithm used by the visual system to derive an 
object’s directionality is therefore currently unknown, and there might be more than one 
mechanism at work.  
 
 
Figure 3.14. Hypothetical example of how a shape could affect target detectability. a) A shape’s topological 
skeleton is found and pruned. Through extension of the axes of the skeleton, perhaps through rules similar to those 
thought to support collinear facilitation or contour completion, it is possible that the shape is grouped more strongly 
with targets on one side than another (here, more with a right than a left target). b) This grouping might be stronger 
for collinear targets (top) than non-collinear targets (middle and bottom).  
 
We can nonetheless theorize about the mechanisms behind our results. One possibility is 
that our effects are driven by axis-based shape processing (see e.g. Blum, 1967: Kimia & 
Appear, 2003: Lin, 1996). There is already some evidence that the visual system can use axis-
based shape representations and that this affects perceptual sensitivity within an object (Hung, 
Carlson, & Connor, 2012; Kimia & Appear, 2003; Kovács, Fehér, & Julesz, 1998; Kovács & 
Julesz, 1994). In figure 3.14, we have included an example shape and one scenario of how a 
shape’s axis might affect target detectability outside its boundaries.  In this example, a shape’s 
topological skeleton is found by gradual erosion of the object’s boundaries without breaking it 
apart (in this case using the bwmorph function of MATLAB’s Image Processing Toolbox). The 
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skeleton is then pruned by cutting off its smallest branches; in computer vision, regularization of 
a skeleton is commonly applied to reduce noise because small changes in the boundary of an 
object can lead to great changes in its skeleton (Shaked & Bruckstein, 1998). The visual system 
might explicitly assign a direction of flow along an axis segment as supposed by some axis 
models such as the shock map (Kimia & Appear, 2003). Through extension of the axes of the 
skeleton, perhaps through rules similar to those hypothesized to support collinear facilitation or 
contour completion (for a review, see Loffler, 2008), it is also possible that the object is grouped 
more strongly with targets on one side than another. For example, the association field model 
assumes that contours are formed by the linking of information across neighboring neural 
receptive fields tuned to similar orientations (Field, Hayes, & Hess, 1993; Ledgeway, Hess, & 
Geisler, 2005). The fact that directionality affects the perception of motion is at least consistent 
with the role of collinear facilitation since it may subserve not only contour formation but 
appears to influence motion perception as well; the speed of collinear sequences is overestimated 
(Seriès, Georges, Lorenceau, & Frégnac, 2002) and a vertical line moved horizontally toward a 
stationary horizontal line can be misinterpreted as the movement of the latter line since it is 
parallel to the direction of motion (Metzger, Spillmann, Lehar, Stromeyer, & Wertheimer, 2006). 
Real-world objects can be viewed as spatiotemporal events, and their motion can be thought of 
as a change in the objects’ boundaries over both space and time. It might therefore be expected 
that mechanisms which support boundary completion in space might also be involved in 
boundary completion over time, where the shape of an object’s current boundaries is used to 
predict its future state. 
If mechanisms such as those underlying collinear facilitation and contour integration are 
involved, then a number of predictions can be made (although there is some disagreement on the 
relation between collinear facilitation and contour integration, see Loffler, 2008; Williams & 
Hess, 1998). First, the biasing effects of a shape might be expected to interact with the qualities 
of the target. The greatest facilitation would be expected for targets that are collinear with the 
directionality of the shape, and little facilitation would be expected for targets orthogonal to or 
tilted relative to the shape’s directionality (Polat & Bonneh, 2000; Polat & Sagi, 1994). Second, 
there might be no congruency effects when an orthogonal distractor is placed between a target 
and a shape (Dresp, 1993). Third, because the detectability of a contour increases with the 
number of elements making up a path (Braun, 1999), a “daisy chain” of shapes could induce 
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stronger congruency effects than a single shape; this is one possible reason why the effects in our 
motion paradigms (experiments 5-7) seemed particularly robust. Fourth, the congruency effect 
would be expected to change in magnitude and even sign with the relative distance between the 
shape and the target (Polat & Sagi, 1993, 1994). Fifth, the congruency effect should reach its 
peak at a later time point with increased distance between the shape and the target (Cass & 
Spehar, 2005). It would in general be very interesting to document further how shape-induced 
biases develop in both space and time, where target detectability would be probed not just at 
several different time points but at various distances and directions from a shape. 
In addition to, or instead of, the mechanisms discussed above, the rules linking shape and 
space might be more explicitly derived from the complex but non-random way in which the 
shape of an object restricts its movements and therefore its probable future location. Our stimuli 
were two-dimensional silhouettes, but real objects exist and move in a fully three-dimensional 
world. If an object is assigned a directionality for the purpose of predicting its future location, 
then real-world objects might have a directionality defined in not just two but three dimensions. 
If all other things are equal, an object is likely to move in a path of least resistance to air flow. 
Preliminary work from our laboratory suggests that directional judgments might be related to a 
shape’s aerodynamic properties. The greater the consensus reached on the directionality of a 
shape, the better its path of least resistance approximated the shape’s empirically defined 
directionality (S. Boger and S. M. Michalak, unpublished observations). Further work on the role 
of aerodynamics is warranted. The current results show that the visual system is able to link the 
appearance of an object with its possible path of motion. Directional information derived from 
shape can be used to guide the eyes and attention to the object’s future location so that it can be 
tracked, examined, and acted on. 
Our experiments were based on the hypothesis that the shape of an object affects the 
weights given to locations in a spatial priority map (Bisley & Goldberg, 2010; Fecteau & Munoz, 
2006; Itti & Koch, 2001). Overt and covert visual attention would be guided to the location of 
peak activity within the map once activity reaches a particular threshold, and this attentional 
orienting signal would in turn bias other processes such as motion perception (Cavanagh, 1992; 
Stelmach, Herdman, & McNeil, 1994; Treue & Maunsell, 1996). Such a tight link between 
shape, attentional priority, and motion perception is biologically plausible; posterior parietal 
regions which play an important role in target selection and visual orienting (Andersen, Snyder, 
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Batista, Buneo, & Cohen, 1998; Arcizet, Mirpour, & Bisley, 2011; Bisley & Goldberg, 2010; 
Colby & Goldberg, 1999; Gottlieb, Kusunoki, & Goldberg, 1998; Silver, Ress, & Heeger, 2005) 
are furthermore selective for the shape of objects (Janssen et al., 2008; Konen & Kastner, 2008; 
Lehky & Sereno, 2007; Red et al., 2012; A. B. Sereno & Amador, 2006; A. B. Sereno & 
Maunsell, 1998) and their activity is predictive of the perceived motion direction of ambiguous 
motion stimuli, even to a greater extent than activity within the classical motion regions MT and 
MST (Williams, Elfar, Eskandar, Toth, & Assad, 2003). The behavioral experiments reported 
here were also directly prompted by our own electrophysiological work where we recorded 
activity of single neurons within these posterior parietal regions (discussed in chapter 2). This 
line of research showed that rapid and automatic neural responses to novel visually presented 
shapes, responses which previously had no known function, could be directly tied to the 
allocation of spatial attention and eye movements. 
There are, however, other possibilities. For example, motion processing might have a 
primary role, where shape directly affects the calculation of motion and overt and covert 
attention is then guided in the direction of movement. Also, if the shape and the target are 
grouped into one perceptual whole, then the effects reported here might not strictly be considered 
only spatial and the enhancement for the target to which a shape points could be closely related 
to object-based attention (Driver & Baylis, 1989; Duncan, 1984; Egly, Driver, & Rafal, 1994). 
The mechanisms behind the behavioral results reported here need to be further studied.  
It is worth noting that earlier attempts to find effects of shape directionality on orienting 
apparently failed (Zusne & Michels, 1964). Zusne and Michels (1964) did not find evidence for 
the idea that people would preferentially follow the main direction of a shape with their eyes. 
The discrepancy between this and the current study could be due to the fact that Zusne and 
Michels (1964) did not empirically define the shapes’ directionality. Wolfe, Klempe, and 
Shulman (1999) also failed to find evidence for the hypothesis that varying an object’s polarity, 
which roughly corresponds to our idea of directionality, led to efficient visual search. They 
concluded that there is little evidence for the preattentive processing of an object’s polarity. We 
do not think that our results necessarily contradict those of Wolfe et al. (1999). As these authors 
themselves acknowledge, it is hard to interpret negative findings. More to the point, we are not 
claiming that directionality is an attribute that supports efficient visual search, or an almost 
instantaneous readout (e.g. pop-out) of some particular information. This kind of fast information 
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detection might be fundamentally different from what we are talking about here, which is a 
stimulus-driven, rapid and seemingly automatic shift in information sampling. An object’s 
directionality also pushes attention away from the object itself. There is no specific reason why a 
strongly directional shape should itself be particularly rapidly detected in a visual search.  
The affordance competition hypothesis (Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010) states that 
sensory information leads to the specification of current action possibilities which then compete 
with each other for ultimate selection for behavior (for uses of the word affordance, see also 
Gibson, 1986; McGrenere & Ho, 2000). Our results could be interpreted within this framework, 
as the shape of an object may lead to the specification of orienting affordances, or the possible 
ways to look and pay attention, some of which have a greater chance of being selected than 
others. Regardless, it is conceivable that the biases we report here can act as a front end to more 
traditionally defined affordance effects that involve physical interactions through reach and grasp 
(Bub & Masson, 2010; Cisek, 2007; Tucker & Ellis, 1998; for further discussion on the possible 
interplay between attention and affordance, see e.g. Anderson, Yamagishi, & Karavia, 2002; 
Handy, Grafton, Shroff, Ketay, & Gazzaniga, 2003; Riggio et al., 2008; Vainio, Ellis, & Tucker, 
2007). Under most circumstances, people look where they are about to act, so eye gaze precedes 
hand movements both inside the laboratory and in real-world tasks (Ballard et al., 1992; Hayhoe, 
2000; Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005; Land & Hayhoe, 2001; Land, Mennie, & Rusted, 1999). Eye 
orientation also directly affects where people reach (Enright, 1995), and dorsal stream posterior 
parietal regions important for saccade and reach planning appear to share a common eye-
centered coordinate frame (Cohen & Andersen, 2002). Visual attention also appears to be 
directed from one object to another when familiar, manipulable objects are positioned in a 
manner that facilitates their interaction, such as when a hammer and a nail are seen together in a 
position that would allow the hammer to strike the nail (Green & Hummel, 2006; Riddoch et al., 
2011; Roberts & Humphreys, 2011; Yoon, Humphreys, & Riddoch, 2010). It would be very 
interesting to see what, if any, role the effects reported here play in such paired-object affordance 
effects. 
While eye and hand are clearly coupled, orienting biases such as those that we see here 
are in all likelihood not identical to reach and grasp affordances. It is not clear if unfamiliar 2D 
silhouettes on a computer screen afford reaching and grasping at all, and the effects are found 
even when the eyes and not the hands are used as effectors. It is also reasonable to assume that 
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shape-induced orienting biases are evoked by objects beyond reach, such as birds in flight. In 
some cases, orienting biases might even directly oppose reach and grasp affordances. For 
example, when using a bottle or teapot, people tend to look at the bottle mouth or spout, or at the 
container into which they are pouring, instead of looking at their hands or the point of contact 
(Hayhoe, 2000; Land et al., 1999). Certain types of affordances and the effects reported here 
might nonetheless share the fundamental property of being “recognition free”, involving a more-
or-less direct coupling between vision and action. 
Being able to circumvent recognition does not necessitate complete isolation from it. 
Within the field of computer vision, the detection of a shape’s orientation is an often-used image 
preprocessing step applied before image registration and recognition (El-Sayed, Abdel-Kader, & 
Ramadan, 2010), and a number of algorithms have been developed to automatically detect the 
orientation and/or directionality of shapes (Cortadellas, Amat, & de la Torre, 2004; El-Sayed et 
al., 2010; Lin, 1996; Martinez-Ortiz & Zunic, 2010; Tzimiropoulos, Mitianoudis, & Stathaki, 
2009; Zunic & Rosin, 2009; Zunic, Rosin, & Kopanja, 2006). The systematic and rapid 
extraction of an object’s directionality could also serve a role in human object recognition (see 
e.g. Leek & Johnston, 2006; Maki, 1986) by facilitating the search for and alignment to an 
existing object template or model.  
In some cases, especially when objects are unfamiliar or if they are seen from an 
unfamiliar viewpoint, visual recognition is viewpoint-dependent (Rock, 1973; Tarr & Bülthoff, 
1998; Tarr & Pinker, 1989; Tarr, Williams, Hayward, & Gauthier, 1998). When a previously 
seen object is encountered again from another viewpoint, the new object instance (or, 
alternatively, an internal reference frame; Robertson, Palmer, & Gomez, 1987) is thought to go 
through an iterative transformation, such as a mental rotation (Carpenter & Just, 1978; Shepard 
& Metzler, 1971; Zacks, 2008; but see Farah & Hammond, 1988; Hayward, Zhou, Gauthier, & 
Harris, 2006; Turnbull & McCarthy, 1996) or alignment (Huttenlocher & Ullman, 1987), that 
orients the observed object with either a previously seen view or a privileged, canonical view 
(Jolicoeur, 1985, 1990; Jolicoeur & Landau, 1984; Palmer, Rosch, & Chase, 1981; Robertson et 
al., 1987; Tarr & Pinker, 1989). Stored object views have a particular orientation and handedness 
(Tarr & Pinker, 1989) which can be thought of as having a specific directionality. The shortest 
path between a new and stored view could conceivably be calculated based on the angular 
difference between the directionality of the stored and observed object.  
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If a sufficient match to a stored representation is not found, directionality could be used 
to standardize the building of a new representation that is not completely dependent on the 
viewpoint from which an object happens to be first seen; the visual input could for instance be 
transformed and stored in a canonical directionality, such as upright. There indeed appears to be 
a favored view from which an object is most readily recognized (Palmer et al., 1981; see also 
Blanz, Tarr, & Bülthoff, 1999; Turnbull, Laws, & McCarthy, 1995), and damage to the parietal 
cortex can lead to specific deficits in recognizing objects from other, more unconventional views 
(Warrington & Taylor, 1973). The loss of the ability to automatically extract an object’s 
directionality could hypothetically lead to such a deficit by preventing the correct normalization 
to a canonical object representation. The suggested route to recognition is just one of potentially 
many possible ways to identify an object (Jolicoeur, 1990; Lawson, 1999; Vanrie, Béatse, 
Wagemans, Sunaert, & Van Hecke, 2002), some of which may not rely in any way on a shape’s 
directionality. Independent of these speculations, here we have shown that shape influences 
processes beyond recognition, and these findings may provide insight into why object form may 
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Dozens of cortical regions in the primate brain are devoted to the processing of visual 
information (Van Essen et al., 2001). Many of these regions are topographically organized so 
that neurons that respond maximally to visual information in nearby spatial regions cluster 
together and form an organized map (Kaas, 1997; Van Essen, Newsome, & Maunsell, 1984; 
Wandell & Winawer, 2011). Several brain regions seem to represent spatial locations in a 
retinotopic coordinate frame (Gardner, Merriam, Movshon, & Heeger, 2008; Golomb & 
Kanwisher, 2012; Wandell & Winawer, 2011). This is perhaps not surprising since doing so 
requires no additional coordinate transformations from the original, native space; light first gets 
transduced into neural signals in the retina of the eye, and where exactly it falls depends on the 
center of gaze. Such maps in posterior visual regions can be revealed by the use of simple visual 
stimuli, such as rotating flickering monochromatic checkerboard patterns, which periodically 
stimulate a particular part of the retina (Engel, Glover, & Wandell, 1997; Engel, Rumelhart, 
Wandell, & Lee, 1994; for a review of retinotopic mapping, see Wandell & Winawer, 2011). 
Several anterior regions also appear to show at least a crude topography but might be 
more particular about the types of stimuli and tasks that effectively reveal the maps. For 
example, maps in the human intraparietal sulcus regions IPS1 and IPS2 were first revealed by the 
use of a covert attentional task (Silver, Ress, & Heeger, 2005) and a memory guided saccade task 
that relied not just on passive visual stimulation but on active memorization of spatial locations 
to which overt and covert visual attention needed to be allocated (Schluppeck, Glimcher, & 
Heeger, 2005).  
 In some circumstances, it might be beneficial to code locations in another type of 
coordinate system that is independent of one’s eye position. The brain indeed seems capable of 
such coordinate transformations (for reviews, see e.g. Andersen, Snyder, Li, & Stricanne, 1993; 
Graziano, 2001). There have been reports of the coding of visual information in several 
egocentric coordinate systems where locations are represented relative to parts of one’s own 
body. These include eye-centered (Batista, Buneo, Snyder, & Andersen, 1999; Mullette-Gillman, 
Cohen, & Groh, 2005; Pouget, Ducom, Torri, & Bavelier, 2002; Vetter, Goodbody, & Wolpert, 
1999), head-centered (Andersen, Essick, & Siegel, 1985; Mullette-Gillman et al., 2005; M. I. 
Sereno & Huang, 2006; Soechting, Tillery, & Flanders, 1990; Zhang, Heuer, & Britten, 2004), 
body-centered (Carrozzo, McIntyre, Zago, & Lacquaniti, 1999), shoulder-centered (Soechting et 
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al., 1990), and joint-centered (Pouget et al., 2002) coordinate systems. Such egocentric coding is 
probably particularly beneficial for action planning since visual information becomes available 
in the space of the body part which needs to be moved. 
 However, there are situations where it might be advantageous not to code where things 
are relative to one’s own body, but relative to other objects in the world. When one watches a 
soccer match, one might want to keep track of where the ball is relative to the goal, where it is 
relative to the players, where the players are relative to each other etc. At any given time point, 
the ball, the goal, and each player all occupy a particular location on the viewer’s retina, and 
several brain regions will inherit and keep that retinotopic frame of reference. High level regions, 
however, might have the capability to further transform this visual information into a stimulus-
centered or object-centered coordinate system that is more suitable for the situation. A stimulus-
centered reference frame is centered on the middle of a target stimulus regardless of its 
egocentric position, while an object-centered reference frame is centered on an object, but its 
left-right orientation is based on the object’s canonical orientation (Medina et al., 2009); an 
object-centered reference frame therefore rotates with the rotation of an object, while a stimulus-
centered reference frame does not. Note that this distinction is not always made and different 
nomenclature may be used (Walker, 1995). 
 Object-centered or stimulus-centered coding has been reported for some cortical regions 
(for a review, see Olson, 2003). Much work has focused on the supplementary eye fields (SEF) 
in the dorsomedial frontal cortex of the macaque monkey. Single neuron activity in SEF can 
depend on whether monkeys make an eye movement to the left or right of a bar, regardless of 
where the bar is relative to the center of gaze (Olson & Gettner, 1995). SEF neurons are mainly 
selective for “contralateral” stimulus-centered space, i.e. the SEF in the left hemisphere mostly 
contains neurons that prefer stimulus-centered rightward locations, and neurons in the right SEF 
predominantly prefer left stimulus-centered space (Olson & Gettner, 1995; Olson & Tremblay, 
2000; Tremblay, Gettner, & Olson, 2002). However, stimulus-centered coding of SEF neurons is 
weak before the monkeys have been explicitly trained on a stimulus-centered task (Olson, 2003), 
begging the question of whether such a coding scheme is mainly of importance after weeks or 
months of training. The monkeys’ task also involved the execution of motor commands so it is 
possible that SEF is involved with stimulus-centered coding of saccadic eye movements but does 
not otherwise encode the visual stimulus-centered location of a target. 
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We are mainly interested in the coding of perceptual and attentional stimulus-centered 
information, in particular the possible role of the dorsal visual pathway in such spatial 
representations. It has been proposed that coding strategies within the dorsal visual pathway are 
largely based on viewer-centered or egocentric coordinate systems (Goodale & Milner, 1992). 
These types of representations can presumably be more easily used by the motor system to 
calculate the movements of the appropriate effector, or body part, to e.g. reach for, grasp, or look 
at an object. There is nonetheless some evidence that object-to-object relational coding relies on 
the parietal cortex.  
Parietal damage sometimes brings on constructional apraxia (Black & Bernard, 1984; 
Black & Strub, 1976; Gainottil, 1978) where patients have difficulties in assembling, drawing, or 
otherwise constructing objects despite being physically able to perform the movements needed 
for the task. This ability depends on relational coding of object parts. Parietal damage can also 
lead to neglect (Medina et al., 2009; Vallar & Perani, 1986) where one side of space is 
unattended or ignored (figure 4.1). While the patients in many cases neglect the contralesional 
egocentric space, such as the space left of the sagittal midplane of the trunk and the line of sight 
(Bisiach, Capitani, & Porta, 1985), neglect can also manifest itself in an allocentric or extra-
personal reference frame (Bickerton, Samson, Williamson, & Humphreys, 2011; Bisiach, Perani, 
Vallar, & Berti, 1986; Driver & Halligan, 1991; Farah, Brunn, Wong, Wallace, & Carpenter, 
1990; Ota, Fujii, Suzuki, Fukatsu, & Yamadori, 2001; Tipper & Behrmann, 1996; Walker & 
Young, 1996; for a review, see Walker, 1995).  
For example, Bickerton et al. (2011) tested patients with acute unilateral brain lesions on 
an “apple cancellation task” where they were presented with 150 line drawings of upright apples 
that were either complete or had a gap on their right or left side. The participants were asked to 
cross out all the complete apples while ignoring incomplete ones. Right-hemisphere patients 
were more likely than left-hemisphere patients to show a page asymmetry in detecting full 
apples, and the side of their lesion predicted the sign of the asymmetry (classified as egocentric 
contralesional neglect). The lesion side predicted the sign of an object-based or stimulus-based 
asymmetry as well; patients with right hemisphere damage were more likely to ignore gaps (i.e. 
mark apples as complete) on the left side of apples (36% of left-hemisphere patients) than the left 
side of apples (3%), and patients with left hemisphere damage were more likely to ignore gaps 
on the apples’ right side (18% of left-hemisphere patients) than they were with gaps on the left 
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(7%). Compared to left-hemisphere patients, right-hemisphere patients also tended to show 
greater object-centered or stimulus-centered spatial asymmetries where they falsely marked 
incomplete apples with gaps on one side as being complete. 
  
Figure 4.1. Hemispatial neglect. When asked to draw a clock, a patient with left hemispatial neglect might ignore 
one side of the clock (image reproduced from a patient’s drawing, see 
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Hemineglect). Most patients neglect a part of egocentric space, but some 
patients also appear to suffer from object-centered or stimulus-centered neglect.  
 
The difference between subtypes of neglect does not appear to be clear-cut and the same 
patient’s neglect might manifest itself in both egocentric and extra-personal or allocentric 
reference frames (Bickerton et al., 2011; Walker, 1995). It is possible that these patients suffer 
from damage to brain regions that simultaneously code for locations both in egocentric and 
object- or stimulus-centered reference frames. There are, however, reports of dissociations of 
neglect as manifested in these different spatial reference frames (Gardner et al., 2008; Marsh & 
Hillis, 2008).  
Damage to the posterior inferior temporal (BA 37) and lateral occipital areas (BA 19) has 
been reported to be most predictive of stimulus-centered neglect (Medina et al., 2009), and 
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damage to the posterior middle/inferior temporal regions (BA 37) was found to be most 
predictive of object-centered neglect. Another study indicated that the extent of damage in the 
right superior temporal cortex (BA 22) predicted the severity of stimulus-centered neglect 
(Shirani et al., 2009). Neither of these studies found parietal damage to be a significant 
independent predictor of stimulus-centered neglect, and both conclude that allocentric coding of 
space (stimulus- or object-centered) involves the ventral visual pathway, while egocentric coding 
of space relies on the dorsal visual pathway. 
Of course, absence of evidence is not evidence for absence. Studies of normal human 
populations and non-human primates seem to potentially indicate a role for the dorsal visual 
pathway/parietal cortex in the stimulus-centered coding of space. Fink, Dolan, Halligan, 
Marshall, and Frith (1997) contrasted an egocentric task with an object- or stimulus-based 
attentional task. In the egocentric task, participants were asked to report whether a line with an 
attached square was on the left or right of fixation, while in the stimulus-centered task, they were 
asked to report whether the square was attached to the left or right side of the line. Relative to the 
control condition, both tasks activated the left and right medial superior parietal cortex, the left 
lateral inferior parietal cortex, the left prefrontal cortex, and the cerebellar vermis, leading the 
authors to conclude that the parietal cortex is important for both object-based (or stimulus-based) 
and egocentric visual attention. These authors also reported that the object-based task evoked 
greater activity than the egocentric task in the left striate and prestriate cortex (BA 17/18) 
although the reason for that is unclear.  
Similar studies were done by Galati et al. (2000) and Neggers, Van der Lubbe, Ramsey, 
and Postma (2006) where subjects judged whether a vertical bar was on the left or right of the 
midline of their bodies (egocentric task) or left or right of the midpoint of a horizontal line whose 
egocentric location could vary (stimulus-centered task). Relative to a control task in Galati et al. 
(2000), the stimulus-centered task activated the right posterior parietal cortex and the right 
frontal premotor cortex. Neggers et al. (2006), on the other hand, concluded from their study that 
spatial coding within the parietal cortex was involved in judging locations from an egocentric 
perspective but reported (amongst other areas) a parametric influence of stimulus-centered 
locations on activity evoked by egocentric judgments in the right medial temporal gyrus within 
the lateral occipital complex (LOC) which is most often considered a part of the ventral visual 
stream (Malach et al., 1995).  
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Still other studies do point to some involvement of the parietal cortex in tasks that 
involve stimulus-centered judgments. Fink et al. (2000) report an involvement of the right 
superior posterior and right inferior parietal lobe in a line bisection judgment task, as well as low 
level visual regions and the cerebellar vermis. In a visuomotor task, Honda, Wise, Weeks, 
Deiber, and Hallett (1998) report the right posterior parietal cortex (BA 7 and 19) as being one of 
the regions activated to a greater degree when subjects used an object-centered rule than when 
they used a screen-centered rule. The authors speculate that this activation could reflect the use 
of the visual information in spatially guided movements. Relative to a control task, Committeri et 
al. (2004) found that several parietal regions were activated when participants had to judge 
which one of two objects was closer to a reference object. These included the superior parietal 
lobule and the intraparietal sulcus, extending posteriorly to occipital regions. When compared to 
the control task, one region in the lateral occipital-temporal (in the right inferior temporal gyrus 
and left inferior occipital gyrus) was found to be solely active in this stimulus-centered task, and 
not in either a viewer-centered or a landmark-centered task. 
Of course, finding that regions are activated during a task that involves relational 
judgments does not necessarily indicate that the region actually carries information about 
stimulus-centered or object-centered spatial locations. Studies that have tried to answer such a 
question have given somewhat equivocal results. Vicente-Grabovetsky, Mitchell, Carlin, and 
Cusack (2011) used MVPA to try to dissociate retinotopic (or eye-centered) and object-based 
coordinates but found no indication of such objectotopy. They speculate that either object-based 
reference frames do not exist or that they are only used in particular tasks or conditions. Golomb 
and Kanwisher (2012) again used MVPA to try to separate retinotopic and spatiotopic location 
coding, spatiotopic here indicating relative to the world, but found that all detectable location 
information was retinotopic. These authors speculate that such representations might only be 
represented implicitly. It is still possible that their subjects might have tried to solve their tasks 
by using strategies that relied more on the coding of retinotopic locations, leaving the 
construction of explicit stimulus-centered location coding unnecessary. 
We are particularly interested in understanding more about spatial representations of higher 
level visual regions, especially within and around the intraparietal sulcus. Several topographic 
maps have been found within and close to the intraparietal sulcus (Schluppeck et al., 2005; M. 
Sereno, Pitzalis, & Martinez, 2001; Silver & Kastner, 2009; Silver et al., 2005). They are named 
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IPS0 (also called V7), IPS1, IPS2 and so forth. The human regions IPS1 and IPS2 are likely 
homologues for the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) of the macaque because these regions show 
various functional similarities (Konen & Kastner, 2008a, 2008b; Silver & Kastner, 2009).  
In light of our previous results, these regions were of primary interest to us. We have 
shown that the shape of objects carries information about salient spatial locations (chapter 3), 
and that this kind of information is represented by LIP neurons (chapter 2). However, there were 
some indications that our shapes were not solely affecting attentional priority signals in a 
retinotopic map since directional biases persisted even though the absolute spatial location of the 
shapes was varied (chapter 3, experiment 6). LIP in monkeys and IPS1/IPS2 in humans have also 
been reported to show tolerance to object transformations, such as translation and scaling (Konen 
& Kastner, 2008b; A. Sereno & Maunsell, 1998). If such results are to be reconciled with our 
interpretation of shape selectivity in LIP and its human homologue as supporting orienting 
guidance, then it needs to be shown that these regions can represent space not just in pure 
retinotopic coordinates but can code for space relative to the location of the object itself. When 
an object is, say, translated to a new retinotopic location, it could still guide your eyes and 
attention to the same relative location in space. Sabes, Breznen, and Andersen (2002) reported 
that they found very little evidence for an object-centered coding scheme for LIP neurons and 
concluded that LIP coded for saccade target locations in retinotopic coordinates. However, as 
pointed out by the authors themselves, this conclusion relies on the assumption that the monkeys 
used an object-based strategy to solve their task. They also rotated their reference object in the 
picture plane which should affect an object-centered reference frame but not a stimulus-centered 
frame. It is still possible that LIP neurons (and neurons in IPS1 and IPS2) can code for locations 
in a stimulus-centered reference frame.  
The main focus of the current study is to explore stimulus-centered coding in visual 
regions, particularly dorsal stream regions, and compare these stimulus-centered regions to both 
retinotopic and object selective regions. For this, we developed a novel stimulus with the goal of 
simultaneously mapping stimulus-centered space, retinotopic space, and object selectivity in 
human visual areas (like in most fMRI studies, we do not distinguish between a retinotopic 
coordinate frame and other egocentric frames of reference, e.g. head-centered). Besides saving 
time, simultaneous mapping gives a unique glimpse into the extensive parallel processing of the 
brain. The implicit assumption is often made that a brain region represents some one particular 
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type of information, whether it is retinotopic location, object-centered location, objects, faces, 
places, colors, etc. There are almost certainly regions that do not lend themselves to this 
taxonomy and simultaneously code for many different things at once.  
To make sure that stimulus-centered spatial locations were task-relevant, we specifically 
asked people to constantly monitor where one object was located in relation to another. We did 
this because object-centered coding requires transformations from the native retinotopic space, 
and it is not clear whether the brain automatically performs such complex computations unless 
the task cannot be solved in any other way. Both objects constantly changed retinotopic 
locations, thus further discouraging the strategy of coding for the objects’ locations in a 
retinotopic coordinate frame. The objects were also always shown on a colorful, rotating, 
flickering checkerboard wedge. When the object that the subjects monitored was in a particular 
stimulus-centered location, all other stimulus-centered locations equidistant to the reference 
object were therefore also occupied by a visual stimulus. All of the corresponding locations on 
the retina should therefore be stimulated more or less to the same degree, making it even less 
likely that retinotopic coding of location is of much use in the task. The experiment was 
controlled by an open source, platform independent program that we intend to make freely 
available for use and modification. 
We expected to be able to map several retinotopic regions and that their boundaries 
would agree with already published data. Severe distortions of maps in lower level visual regions 
that are already known to have a clear retinotopy would indicate a failure of maintaining fixation 
despite fixation training. We also expected to find both dorsal and ventral object selective 
regions in higher level visual cortex. We finally expected some higher level visual regions, but 
not lower level visual regions such as the primary visual cortex, to show indications of stimulus-
centered location coding. We were particularly interested in looking at the contribution of 
parietal cortical areas, such as IPS1 and IPS2, to such stimulus-centered coding. We also 
expected left higher level visual regions to mainly prefer right stimulus-centered space, and right 
higher level visual regions to mainly prefer left stimulus-centered space, and we through it 
possible that this asymmetry was greater in the right hemisphere. Finally, we were interested in 
seeing where these stimulus-centered and retinotopic regions were relative to object selective 
regions in the dorsal visual pathway. We thought it likely that they would show considerable 
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overlap; one possible reason for object selectivity in the dorsal visual pathway is that objects, 
unlike scrambled objects, have an orienting affordance and thus provide spatial information.  
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
16 people (four women) between the ages of 18 to 29 years (mean: 24) participated in the 
experiments. They were all right handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They all 
gave their written consent prior to behavioral training and scanning. The experimental protocol 
was approved by Brown University’s Institutional Review Board. 
Stimuli 
The mapping stimulus (see figure 4.2) used in this study was to a large extent modeled by 
that of Swisher, Halko, Merabet, McMains, and Somers (2007) which successively mapped 
retinotopic regions of the parietal cortex. The stimulus consisted of a flickering checkerboard 
pattern. The pattern extended to the borders of a square region (22 x 22 degrees of visual angle) 
whose upper and lower borders reached the edges of the display. Adjacent checks were of an 
opposite brightness so bright and dark checks alternated. The checks changed from light to dark 
at a frequency of 4 Hz. At the same frequency, each check was randomly assigned a new color. 
The radius of the checks increased logarithmically with eccentricity. Each individual check had a 
fixed location. The entire flickering checkerboard was viewed through a 90º wedge-shaped 
aperture which smoothly rotated around a central fixation spot. The central fixation spot was a 
filled white circle (diameter ~0.2 degrees of visual angle) with an inner smaller black circle 
(diameter ~0.1 degrees of visual angle). The wedge started at the top position at the beginning of 
each run and rotated clockwise or counterclockwise, depending on the run, at a fixed rate. The 




Figure 4.2. An example frame showing the mapping stimulus.  
 
84 color images of objects on a gray background and phase scrambled versions of those 
same images were used as secondary stimuli. Images in each run were randomly picked without 
replacement until all images had been shown. The image order was then shuffled again in the 
same manner. An image was displayed in the center of the primary wedge stimulus, and 
smoothly moved at the same rate as the wedge. The images were shown through a Gaussian 
aperture within a circular region (from now on referred to as “the planet”). A spot identical to the 
central fixation spot was always shown in the center of the planet. The center of the planet had a 
fixed eccentricity of ~6 degrees of visual angle. 
Each image was shown for one second. The stream of images was continuous (stimulus 
onset asynchrony 0 ms). Objects and scrambled objects were shown in 10 second blocks each. 10 
objects therefore alternated with 10 scrambled objects (0.05 Hz).  
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A black circle (from now on referred to as “the moon”) with a diameter of ~2 degrees 
orbited the planet at a fixed rate. One orbit took 30 seconds. The distance between the center of 
the planet and the center of the moon was fixed at ~3 degrees. At the beginning of each run, the 
moon’s started in the upper-most position relative to the center of the planet. It orbited the planet 
in the same direction (clockwise or counterclockwise) as the direction in which the planet orbited 
the central fixation spot.  
Procedure 
The subjects were asked to maintain fixation at all times while constantly monitoring where 
the moon was positioned relative to the center of the planet. All participants practiced the task 
outside the scanner. 12 out of 16 participants were trained to maintain fixation while doing the 
task prior to their scanning session. Their eye movements were recorded and auditory feedback 
was given whenever their eyes strayed more than 1.75 degrees away from the screen’s center. 
The participants were trained to a criterion; they practiced the task in four-minute blocks until 
their eyes only deviated from the allotted central spot a maximum of two times in a block. Most 
participants reached this criterion within one or two blocks. The remaining four participants were 
all experienced psychophysical subjects. They were tested in the same way after their scanning 
session. None of them deviated from the allotted central location more than two times during a 
block. Eye position was monocularly recorded at 1000 Hz. The analog signal was sampled and 
digitized at 200 Hz. Calibration was done by asking people to saccade to small targets at several 
locations on the screen. 
Each participant’s fMRI session started with a high-resolution anatomical scan, followed by 
four 8-minute functional mapping runs. Mapping runs took eight minutes each. Each person 
completed two clockwise runs, one of which started with an object block and the other which 
started with a block of scrambled objects, and two counter-clockwise, again one starting with 
objects and the other starting with scrambled objects. Run order was counterbalanced between 
participants. 
MRI Data Acquisition 
Scanning was done on a 3T Tim Trio MRI system (Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, 
Germany) using a 32-channel head coil. High-resolution anatomical images were collected using 
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an MEMPRAGE (Multi-Echo Magnetization-Prepared Rapid-Acquisition Gradient Echo) 
sequence (TE=1.64 ms, 3.50 ms, 5.36 ms, and 7.22 ms, TR=2530 ms, FOV=256 mm, 176 slices, 
voxel size=1 mm
3
). Whole-brain functional images were acquired using an EPI sequence 
(TE=28 ms, TR=2500 ms, FOV=192 mm, 42 slices, voxel size: 3 mm
3
) with an interleaved slice 
acquisition. The scanner automatically discarded two pre-steady-state volumes at the beginning 
of each acquisition sequence. The start of the acquisition of the first additional volume triggered 
the beginning of stimulus presentation. 
MRI Data Analysis 
High resolution anatomical images were used to reconstruct the cortical surface using 
FreeSurfer’s (http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu) automatic cortical reconstruction pipeline 
(Dale, Fischl, & Sereno, 1999; Fischl, Sereno, & Dale, 1999). Data from the mapping runs were 
analyzed using AFNI (Cox, 1996; Cox & Hyde, 1997) and SUMA (Saad, Reynolds, Argall, 
Japee, & Cox, 2004). Raw data from mapping runs were analyzed in two different ways, one for 
the purpose of doing retinotopic mapping, and the other for linear regression.  
For retinotopic mapping, data was first slice timing corrected. The EPI volumes and the 
anatomical were registered to the fourth volume of the first EPI series. The time series was 
mapped to a standard mesh model (mesh density linear depth: 141) of the subject’s cortical 
surface and were smoothed on the surface to a target blur level of 6.0 mm FWHM. The time 
series were then fast Fourier transformed (FFT) so that the power and the phase at the 
fundamental frequency of the wedge (0.02 Hz) could be estimated for each surface node. Each 
phase corresponds to a particular polar angle of the checkerboard wedge. Borders of a 
continuous strip of retinotopic areas from the primary visual cortex to IPS1 were then drawn by 
hand on the inflated cortical surface (V1, V2d, V3d, V3A, V3B, V7/IPS0, and IPS1). Map 
boundaries for other IPS regions were unclear for many subjects and were thus not included in 
the ROI analysis.  
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Figure 4.3. Three example subjects. The subjects’ dorsal cortical surface (right hemisphere, inflated view) is 
shown. For clarity, indicators of gyri and sulci are not shown. Black outlined regions (transparent for retinotopic 
regions, otherwise solid color) responded more to object-centered left positions than to object-centered right 
positions. White outlined regions (transparent for retinotopic regions, otherwise solid color) responded to a greater 
degree to object-centered right positions than to object-centered left positions. The stimulus-centered contrast is 
thresholded at p=0.001, uncorrected, no clustering. These stimulus-centered regions are shown on top of the 
subjects’ retinotopic maps (blue: retinotopic down; green: retinotopic left; red: retinotopic up; yellow: retinotopic 
right). 
For the latter analysis, data were slice timing corrected and despiked. The anatomical was 
aligned to the first functional volume. Functional volumes were registered to this first functional 
volume as well. The functional data was then mapped to a standard mesh model (mesh density 
linear depth: 141) of the subject’s cortical surface.  
For exploratory analysis of the entire cortical surface, the functional data was smoothed on 
the surface to a resulting blur level of 6.0 mm FWHM. Each voxel’s time series was then scaled 
to have a mean of 100, where a change of one unit represented 1% change. Ordinary least 
squares (OLSQ) regression was then performed. We included the following conditions: Left 
wedge (any time the entire wedge was on the left side of the screen; 12 second duration), right 
wedge (any time the entire wedge was on the right side of the screen; 12 second duration), left 
moon (any time when the moon’s center was anywhere between 36° and 144° relative to the 
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center of the planet; 9 second duration; 0° is up relative to the center of the planet, 90° is left, 
180° is down, and 270° is right), right moon (when the moon’s center was between 216° and 
324° relative to the planet’s center), objects (10 second duration), and scrambled objects (10 
second duration).  
Ideal reference time series for each condition were constructed by modeling them with 
boxcar functions (1 for the stimulus duration, otherwise 0). An incomplete gamma function was 
then convolved with the boxcar functions. The reference time series were included in the model 
as regressors of interest. Six estimated motion parameters (three translation movements, three 
rotation movements) and their derivatives were used as nuisance regressors in the model. The 
mean, and linear, quadratic, cubic, and quartic trends across time were also removed. Volumes 
with excessive motion were censored (the derivative of motion parameters was found and the 
square root of the sum of squares was taken; if this Euclidean norm exceeded 0.3 mm, then the 
TR was not included). Volumes were also censored if over 10% of voxels in the volume were 
outliers, as defined by the AFNI program 3dToutcount. Beta coefficients for each regressor of 
interest were computed.  
For each participant, the difference between the beta values for the right and left moon 
conditions (right moon – left moon contrast) was calculated for each surface node in the standard 
surface mesh (Argall, Saad, & Beauchamp, 2006). Single group t-tests were then done on these 
beta differences. Single group t-tests were done in the same manner for right wedge – left wedge, 
and for objects – scrambled objects. 
For ROI analysis, the ROIs drawn on the surface were projected back into volume. Only 
voxels belonging to the pial surface were included. The same was done for the functional time 
series from each run. The time series for the voxels belonging to each ROI mask were then 
averaged at each corresponding time point, and the resulting mean time series was scaled to have 
a mean of 100, and a unit size of 1% signal change. Linear regression was performed on each of 
these ROI time series in the same manner as described above. The beta coefficient differences 




For each participant, beta coefficient differences for stimulus-centered coding (percent 
signal difference for right moon – left moon) were found for each ROI in each hemisphere 
(figures 4.3 and 4.4). IPS1 was our primary region of interest so we first performed single group 
t-tests, one for the IPS1 region in each hemisphere, against the null hypothesis of no difference 
between the right and left moon conditions. No significant difference was found for IPS1 in the 
left hemisphere (t(15) = -0.723, p = 0.481) but a significant difference was found for the IPS1 
region in the right hemisphere (t(15) = -2.176, p = 0.046). The difference between the IPS1 
regions in the two hemispheres was also significant (paired samples t-test, t(15) = -2.578, p = 
0.021). The right hemisphere IPS1 thus responded to a greater degree when the moon was to the 
left of the planet than when it was to the right of the planet, and did so to a greater extent than the 
IPS1 region in the left hemisphere.  
A repeated measures region (V1, V2d, V3d, V3A, V3B, V7/IPS0, and IPS1) x 
hemisphere (left and right) ANOVA was then performed. Degrees of freedom were Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected in cases where Mauchly’s test of sphericity was significant. 
No main effects of region were detected (F(2.553, 38.296) = 0.822, p = 0.473); there 
were thus no overall detectable differences in the degree to which different ROIs (collapsing 
across hemispheres) preferred the right moon over the left moon. There was, however, a main 
effect of hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 7.958, p = 0.013). Right hemisphere regions in general tended to 
prefer left stimulus-centered space, and left hemisphere regions tended to prefer right stimulus-
centered space, and the difference between the hemispheres was significant. It should be noted 
that this effect appears to be  mainly driven by the right hemisphere’s preference for left 
stimulus-centered space (see figure 4.4). 
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Figure 4.4. The average % signal change per ROI for the right minus left moon contrast. 
 
Finally, there was a significant region x hemisphere interaction (F(3.186, 47.797) = 
5.563, p = 0.002; see also figure 4.4). To quantify this interaction, we followed this up with 
paired samples t-tests for each individual region where we compared the stimulus-centered 
location preference for the two hemispheres. This hemispheric difference in percent signal 
change can be interpreted as the degree of stimulus-centered “contralateral” preference (positive 
scores) and stimulus-centered “ipsilateral” preference (negative scores). From now on, we will 
just refer to it as stimulus-centered contralateral preference. As can be seen in figure 4.5, the low 
level regions V1 (p = 0.333) and V2d (p = 0.142) did not show a difference in their stimulus-
centered contralateral preference, and neither did V3B (p = 0.469). V3d, however, did show such 
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an effect, where the right hemisphere had a greater preference for left stimulus-centered space 
(compared to right stimulus-centered space) than the left hemisphere did (p = 0.046). The same 
was true for V3A (p = 0.001), IPS0 (p = 1.7 x 10
-4
), and IPS1 (p = 0.021). It should be noted that 
two regions, V3A and IPS0, survive a fully Bonferroni corrected alpha value of 0.0071. 
 
Figure 4.5. Stimulus-centered coding by cortical region. The average signal difference between right and left 
stimulus-centered locations (right moon – left moon) was found for each retinotopic region in each hemisphere. For 
each region, the difference scores for the two hemispheres were then compared. For each region, the difference 
between the scores for the two hemispheres was taken (left hemisphere – right hemisphere). This hemispheric 
difference in percent signal change can be interpreted as the degree of stimulus-centered “contralateral” preference 
(positive scores) and stimulus-centered “ipsilateral” preference (negative scores; null hypothesis, no preference; * 
indicates p < 0.05; ** indicates p < 0.005; *** indicates p < 0.0005).  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
We also compared the degree of stimulus-centered contralateral preference between the 
different cortical regions with additional paired samples t-tests. As can be seen in table 4.1, V2d, 
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V3d, V3A, IPS0, and IPS1 all show stimulus-centered contralateral preference that is 
significantly greater than that of V1. V3A, IPS0, and IPS1 also have a stimulus-centered 
contralateral preference that is of a significantly greater magnitude than that of V3B. V3A and 
IPS0 have greater stimulus-centered contralateral preference than does V3d. The contralateral 
preferences of V3A, IPS0, and IPS1, while significantly different from both zero and from the 
control region V1, cannot be statistically determined to be different from one another. Note that 
even with a full Bonferroni correction (α= 0.0024), V3d, V3A, and IPS0 still all have a 
significantly greater stimulus-centered contralateral preference than does the control region V1. 
Table 4.1. Comparison of stimulus-centered “contralateral” preference between retinotopic cortical regions. 
Significant differences are noted with stars (* indicates p < 0.05; ** indicates p < 0.005; *** indicates p < 0.0005). 
Next to the stars is the name of the region whose stimulus-centered contralateral difference is the greater of the two. 
 V1 V2d V3d V3A V3B V7/IPS0 IPS1 
V1  V2d* V3d** V3A***  IPS0** IPS1* 
V2d V2d*       
V3d V3d**   V3A*  IPS0*  
V3A V3A***  V3A*  V3A*   
V3B    V3A*  IPS0** IPS1* 
V7/IPS0 IPS0**  IPS0*  IPS0**   
IPS1 IPS1*    IPS1*   
 
Analysis of the whole cortical surface 
In addition to the main region-of-interest analysis, we performed an exploratory analysis 
of the entire cortical surface. The results of three t-tests for the right minus left moon contrast, 
the right – left wedge contrast, and the objects – scrambled contrast are shown together on an 




Figure 4.6. Exploratory analysis of the whole cortical surface – dorsal stream. Cyan: Left retinotopic 
preference. Yellow: Right retinotopic preference. Blue: Left stimulus-centered preference. Red: Right stimulus-
centered preference. Black: Object preference. Not shown: Scrambled preference. Colors are blended in overlap 
regions.  
 
There are several things to be noted. First of all, two clusters of a size greater than 500 
mm
2
 are found in each hemisphere for the stimulus-centered right – left moon contrast. Both 
have a stimulus-centered contralateral preference. The more posterior cluster covers parts of the 
ascending limb of the inferior temporal sulcus (anterior occipital sulcus), the inferior occipital 
sulcus and gyrus, the middle occipital gyrus, and the middle occipital and lunate sulcus. The 
other more anterior cluster is found mainly in the superior parietal cortex but extends into the 
intraparietal and postcentral sulci. Both clusters are mainly found within regions that have a 
contralateral retinotopic preference although, interestingly, the anterior cluster extends into 
regions that are flanked by regions with a contralateral retinotopic preference but they 
themselves show no consistent retinotopic contralateral or ipsilateral preference.  
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Figure 4.7. Exploratory analysis of the whole cortical surface – ventral stream. Cyan: Left retinotopic 
preference. Yellow: Right retinotopic preference. Blue: Left stimulus-centered preference. Red: Right stimulus-
centered preference. Black: Object preference. Not shown: Scrambled preference. Colors are blended in overlap 
regions.  
 
  A second thing to note is that object-selective regions form a continuous strip extending 
from anterior ventral regions all the way to high level dorsal stream regions in the intraparietal 
sulcus (figures 4.6 and 4.7). On the ventral surface, especially in the right hemisphere, object 
selective regions extend more anteriorly than the regions that show a consistent contralateral 
preference for retinotopic space. Object-selective regions also partially overlap with the posterior 
stimulus-centered clusters.  
Object-selectivity in dorsal regions, unlike in ventral regions, appears to be restricted to 
regions with a contralateral retinotopic preference. Interestingly, while a large extent of the 
dorsal stream is found to be object-selective, these object-selective regions overlap very little 
with regions showing stimulus-centered coding of space. Object-selective regions are found to be 
more lateral and posterior than areas that show stimulus-centered coding. 
Discussion 
We used a novel mapping stimulus to simultaneously map retinotopic space, stimulus-
centered space, and object selectivity in the human brain. Retinotopy, especially in lower level 
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visual regions, agreed well with published data on retinotopic mapping. The current work 
additionally supports the idea that higher level regions of the dorsal stream can code for space in 
a stimulus-centered, non-egocentric reference frame. The retinotopic coordinate system 
nonetheless tended to dominate, and most regions showing the capability of coding for space in 
stimulus-centered coordinates were confined within areas of cortex that also showed a preference 
for contralateral retinotopic space.  
Object selective regions in the dorsal stream, unlike those of the ventral stream, were also 
found almost completely within the boundaries of regions with a contralateral retinotopic 
preference. Stimulus-centered regions and object selective regions in the dorsal visual pathway 
were, however, largely separable. There is an apparent distinction between dorso-dorsal regions 
that prefer objects and contralateral retinotopic space, on the one hand, and dorso-ventral regions 
that prefer contralateral stimulus-centered and contralateral retinotopic space, on the other hand. 
While somewhat surprising, it has already been suggested based on anatomical data from 
macaques that the dorsal visual pathway should be further subdivided into a dorso-dorsal stream 
and a dorso-ventral stream that might serve different functions (Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003).  
A region-of-interest analysis confirmed that the intraparietal region IPS1 shows a 
contralateral stimulus-centered preference. This is mainly true for the right IPS1 which shows a 
preference for stimulus-centered leftward locations. IPS1 and its putative macaque homologue, 
LIP, both respond selectively to the shape of visually presented objects, even when the objects 
are not overtly acted on (Janssen, Srivastava, Ombelet, & Orban, 2008; Konen & Kastner, 
2008b; Lehky & Sereno, 2007; A. Sereno & Maunsell, 1998). The purpose of this shape 
selectivity has been unknown although our work (see chapters 2 and 3) suggests that it could 
support overt and covert orienting of attention, where the shape of an object biases the eyes and 
attention in a particular direction; if this bias is toward the preferred location of an LIP neuron, 
the neuron is more likely to preferably respond to that shape.  
What at first seems inconsistent with this idea is that shape selectivity within IPS1 and 
LIP can be resistant to some visual transformations of the shape (Konen & Kastner, 2008b; A. 
Sereno & Maunsell, 1998). Given that eye position is fixed, one might expect that a shape that 
supposedly biased orienting toward the preferred location of a neuron would not do so anymore 
if translated to a different position within the picture plane. This is for the most part true if the 
neuron only codes for space in a retinotopic frame of reference. If some neurons, however, 
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primarily or additionally code for space in a stimulus-centered reference frame, then the spatial 
bias in that particular coordinate system should persist even though the object is moved within 
the picture plane. The current experiment is consistent with this possibility. 
Neurons in LIP, the probable IPS1 homologue in macaques, have already been shown to 
transiently shift their spatial representations immediately preceding a saccade, where the neurons 
briefly code for the location of visual stimuli not relative to the current center of gaze, but the 
immediate future center of gaze (Colby & Goldberg, 1992). LIP therefore already has the 
available machinery to represent space relative to the center of a “virtual eye”. It does not require 
the suspension of belief that such machinery in IPS1 could have been built upon and modified so 
as to maintain such a representation centered on a point in space other than the current center of 
gaze when the situation requires it. 
Further analysis showed that IPS0 (V7), V3A, and possibly V3d also show a contralateral 
stimulus-centered preference where the left hemisphere tends to prefer rightward stimulus-
centered locations while the right hemisphere tends to prefer leftward stimulus-centered 
locations. Gardner et al. (2008) measured activity in several human visual regions by 
independently varying fixation position and the position of target stimuli relative to the screen 
(although this could not be distinguished from varying locations relative to the head or other 
egocentric yet non-retinotopic frames of references). They reported that V3, V3A, and IPS0 all 
coded for spatial locations in a retinotopic reference frame. One of the possible reasons for the 
discrepancy between Gardner et al. (2008) and the current results is that Gardner et al. (2008) 
looked for the coding of locations relative to a fixed reference frame (the screen, as well as the 
head and trunk) while in the current study, people were asked to monitor the relative locations of 
two objects which both constantly changed location relative to the center of gaze, the head, the 
body, and the screen. The need for explicit stimulus-centered coding of space might have been 
much greater in the current study.  
An exploratory analysis of the whole cortical surface indicated two large clusters of 
stimulus-centered regions within high-level visual regions. Based on the anatomical location of 
the more posterior cluster and its partial overlap with highly object-selective regions, we estimate 
this to be the location of the human MT+ complex (Dumoulin et al., 2000; Malikovic et al., 
2007) and the lateral occipital complex (LOC; Malach et al., 1995).  Some previous work has 
suggested that the LOC (McKyton & Zohary, 2007) and the human MT (d'Avossa et al., 2006) 
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represent locations in a spatiotopic (i.e. non-retinotopic, such as relative to the head or the 
borders of the screen/goggles that were used for stimulus presentation) coordinate frame while 
follow-up work has found spatial representations of both areas to be more consistent with the use 
of a pure retinotopic coordinate frame (Gardner et al., 2008; Golomb & Kanwisher, 2012). Our 
results are consistent with McKyton and Zohary (2007) and d'Avossa et al. (2006) but go beyond 
their results because these previous studies did not distinguish between a stimulus-centered 
reference frame and other non-retinotopic reference frames such as head-centered or body-
centered. Our results indicate that the human MT+ complex can represent locations in both 
egocentric and stimulus-centered coordinates.  
An anterior cluster showing stimulus-centered spatial coding was also found. While being 
mostly confined within regions that showed a preference for contralateral retinotopic space, this 
cluster filled in gaps in otherwise retinotopic regions. Gaps in retinotopic regions within the 
parietal cortex have been reported before and the reason for such dropout regions is not 
completely understood (Silver & Kastner, 2009; Swisher et al., 2007). We offer one possible 
reason, namely that these dropout regions represent space not in retinotopic coordinates but in 
stimulus-centered coordinates. 
Given the large overlap of this anterior stimulus-centered cluster with regions that prefer 
contralateral retinotopic space, its general lack of object selectivity, as well as its anatomical 
location mostly in the superior parietal lobule but branching into the intraparietal sulcus and the 
postcentral sulcus (Konen & Kastner, 2008a), we judge this region to overlap with retinotopic 
regions IPS5 and SPL1. It has been suggested that IPS5 is homologous to the macaque area VIP 
(Konen & Kastner, 2008a; M. I. Sereno & Huang, 2006; Silver & Kastner, 2009) while SPL1 is 
homologous to the macaque parietal area 7a (Konen & Kastner, 2008a; Silver & Kastner, 2009). 
This is in line with recent electrophysiological work in monkeys where a population of neurons 
in area 7a was found to systematically vary its responses dependent on whether a task-relevant 
target was to the left or right of a reference object (Chafee, Averbeck, & Crowe, 2007). IPS5 and 
VIP can represent visual space in a head-centered coordinate system (Duhamel, Colby, & 
Goldberg, 1998; M. I. Sereno & Huang, 2006). Our data suggests that the human IPS5 might be 
capable of supporting spatial representations in other non-retinotopic coordinate systems as well, 
such as a stimulus-centered reference frame. 
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To conclude, we have shown that high-level regions of the human visual system can code 
for the location of an object in a stimulus-centered frame of reference. This includes regions that 
are part of the dorsal visual pathway, supporting the idea that the dorsal stream participates in 
various coordinate transformations from the native retinotopic space, not only into other 
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In psychology and neuroscience, objects in the world and the space that they occupy are 
often implicitly treated as separable from each other and studied in isolation. In this thesis, I have 
described several experiments that explore how objects affect the space around them. 
As described in chapter 2, we first recorded the activity of single neurons within the 
lateral intraparietal area (LIP) of the dorsal visual pathway of non-human primates. This line of 
research showed that rapid responses of these neurons to visual objects, responses which 
previously had no known function, could be directly tied to the brain region’s role in the 
allocation of spatial attention and eye movements. The findings were two-fold. First, automatic, 
bottom-up neural responses to familiar visual objects reflect the organism’s history of learning to 
associate these objects with looking toward certain spatial locations within the visual field. 
Secondly, fast, automatic neural responses to never-before-seen objects contain information on 
where a monkey will look and pay attention once these objects are encountered again in the 
future.  
These results highlight two things from a behavioral perspective: First, with enough 
training, completely arbitrary associations between a visual stimulus and a behavioral response 
toward a spatial location can become extremely rapid and automatic. Secondly, not all 
associations between objects and space are made equal. There appear to be predispositions to 
associate objects of certain shapes with looking toward particular locations, where a completely 
novel object seemingly has the ability to automatically push the monkey’s eyes and attention in a 
certain direction. This had never been previously reported.  
 This led to a new line of human behavioral research, described in chapter 3, which 
showed that objects indeed do not start out as neutral. Instead, spatial information is extracted 
from the shape of even completely novel, randomly generated objects. Information derived from 
the shape of objects is integrated into a variety of processes, such as the allocation of visual 
attention, the programming of eye movements, and the perception of motion. This happens 
swiftly and automatically without specific learning or training and is not easily overridden by 
experience. Up to this point, it had been a hotly debated topic whether such effects were found 
for highly specialized and over-learned stimuli, such as arrows and eye gaze. This work shows 
that effects commonly associated with such stimuli may instead represent a fundamental property 
of all objects.  
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Here, novel behavioral effects were predicted based on neurophysiological data. Had 
these effects not been found in people, it would have cast doubts on the generality of the 
neurophysiological findings. The neurophysiological and behavioral experiments complement 
each other, giving an example of how research in neuroscience and psychology can mutually 
benefit both fields. 
Our interpretation of these results is that the shape of objects can directly influence 
weights given to different locations in a spatial priority map, thus biasing where one looks and 
pays attention, and that LIP can construct such a priority map. Initially, we had assumed that the 
map must represent space in retinotopic or eye-centered coordinates, i.e. relative to the center of 
gaze. There were, however, some aspects of our results and those of other people that gave hints 
that this might not necessarily be the case. 
First of all, the results of experiment 6 in chapter 3 indicated that the shape of objects 
could bias attention in a particular direction regardless of the objects’ starting position. This is 
not necessarily inconsistent with effects in a retinotopic map, such as the formation of a spatial 
priority gradient with low values on one side of fixation and high on the other. This nonetheless 
made us think about whether our effects were more easily understood as affecting priority to 
locations not relative to the line of sight, but relative to the objects themselves. These 
speculations were further bolstered by reports of both LIP and its supposed human homologues 
IPS1 and IPS2 showing some invariance or at least tolerance to spatial transformations of 
objects, such as when objects are shown from slightly different viewpoints, are translated within 
the picture plane, or are scaled up or down (Konen & Kastner, 2008b; A. Sereno & Maunsell, 
1998).  
Such reports at a first glance appear to go against our interpretations of LIP object 
selectivity as a manifestation of shape-derived spatial priority signals. Careful scrutiny still 
shows that this only needs to be the case if such transformations dramatically affect the supposed 
weights in the spatial priority map. My own unpublished observations show that moderate 
changes in an object’s 3D viewpoint can still preserve the orienting behavior that it evokes. The 
same object seen from two moderately different viewpoints tends to evoke similar numbers of 
saccades of similar durations in similar directions and with saccade vectors of similar lengths. 
Saccadic scanpaths, just like LIP and IPS1/IPS2 object selectivity, therefore can show tolerance 
to changes in viewpoint. 
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Figure 5.1 also illustrates a hypothetical example of how a retinotopic (or eye-centered) 
spatial priority map could retain a degree of transformation invariance. An object can be 
translated (panel B), scaled up or down (panel C), and even rotated (panel D), yet still always 
point to the same preferred retinotopic location of a neuron. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Hypothetical transformation invariance in a retinotopic spatial priority map. Even though an 
object goes through certain spatial transformations, it can hypothetically still point to a preferred location of a 
neuron despite the fact that the neuron represents space in a coordinate system centered on the line of sight. A) 
Before transformation. B) Scaling. C) Translation. D) Translation, mirroring, and rotation. 
 
Some translations within the picture plane might still be problematic. As can be seen in 
figure 5.2, neurons that represent spatial priority in a retinotopic (or eye-centered) reference 
frame are not expected to tolerate certain translations of an object. If panels A and B are 
compared, a neuron might only be expected to become activated in panel A and not B because 
the object only points to its preferred retinotopic location in the former case but not the latter. If, 
however, the neuron in addition or instead has a preferred stimulus-centered location, as shown 
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in panel C, then the object still points to the same location within that reference frame and the 
neuron is expected to show a degree of translational invariance or tolerance. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Hypothetical comparison of translational invariance and dependence in a retinotopic and 
stimulus-centered spatial priority map. A) Before transformation. B) After translation, the object no longer points 
toward a neuron’s preferred retinotopic location. C) After translation, the object still point to a neuron’s preferred 
stimulus-centered location.  
 
As discussed in chapter 4, the human intraparietal region IPS1, a putative human 
homologue of LIP in the macaque, is capable of representing spatial locations in such a stimulus-
centered coordinate frame in addition to a retinotopic coordinate frame. This is also true for 
several other high-level regions within the dorsal visual pathway. The dorsal visual pathway 
therefore does not only use egocentric frames of reference, but is capable of transforming visual 
signals from the native retinotopic space to other coordinate systems that might be more suitable 
to the current task or goal.  
Why would a brain region that supposedly constructs a spatial priority map used for 
orienting guidance need to represent space in multiple reference frames? Such a complex 
representation of space seems unnecessary if the goal is to pick a single location in space that has 
the highest likelihood of containing important visual information that needs to be further 
scrutinized by the allocation of overt and covert visual attention.  
However, we do not always just plan where we are going to look next. Saccades can be 
planned not as single events but as patterned sequences, where programs for saccades might be 
retrieved from memory in groups of more than one at a time (Zingale & Kowler, 1987). Two 
different modes of saccade sequence execution have been identified (Ditterich, Eggert, & 
Straube, 1998). In a closed-loop mode, the actor compensates for position errors during the 
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execution of the sequence, so the saccades are not completely preprogrammed. However, in an 
open-loop mode, more than one saccade vector in the sequence is preprogrammed. The saccades 
are executed without feedback-driven error correction so position errors propagate from one 
stage of the sequence to another. Ditterich et al. (1998) note that people appear to have a motor 
memory with a capacity for about three saccades.  
When people make a saccade to target a new object, they often perform in a closed-loop 
mode, so that new visual information about the landing position of the previous saccade is taken 
into account before the new saccade vector is executed (Vergilino-Perez & Findlay, 2006). A 
scanning saccade within an object, however, is often coded in an open-loop mode as a fixed 
magnitude motor vector applied irrespective of the landing position of the preceding saccade 
(Vergilino-Perez & Findlay, 2006). It therefore seems like orienting behavior that is based on 
visual information about the shape of objects is special in the sense that it is more likely to be 
preprogrammed and executed without taking into account new information after a previous 
saccade when the eyes have moved to a new location.  
 
 
Figure 5.3. Hypothetical multi-layered priority map. An example is shown of a neuron with a preferred location 
both in a retinotopic coordinate system (blue) and a stimulus-centered coordinate system (pink). Such a priority map 
allows for the simultaneous planning of two saccades where the second saccade vector is planned relative to the 
location the object; this saccade vector can be executed without modification from the landing position of the first 
saccade on the object. 
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Functional studies have identified LIP and IPS1 as playing a role in visual orienting 
(Andersen, Snyder, Batista, Buneo, & Cohen, 2008; Andersen & Gnadt, 1989; Colby & 
Goldberg, 1999; Gottlieb, Kusunoki, & Goldberg, 1998; Konen & Kastner, 2008a; Mirpour, 
Arcizet, Ong, & Bisley, 2009). These regions also show shape selectivity and working memory 
related activity (Andersen, Bracewell, Barash, Gnadt, & Fogassi, 1990; Janssen, Srivastava, 
Ombelet, & Orban, 2008; Konen & Kastner, 2008b; Lehky & Sereno, 2007; Mazzoni, 
Bracewell, Barash, & Andersen, 1996; A. Sereno & Maunsell, 1998; A. B. Sereno & Amador, 
2006; Silver & Kastner, 2009; Xu & Chun, 2005). We hypothesize that LIP and IPS1 can act as a 
multi-orienting memory buffer. This could indicate that these regions have a multi-layered 
priority map. They would code for the priority of an upcoming saccade (or covert orienting of 
attention) to a location in a retinotopic coordinate frame, but simultaneously, they could 
hypothetically code for the priority of a second saccade to a location in a stimulus-centered 
coordinate system (see figure 5.3).  
We also think that it is likely that such a multi-layered priority map is hierarchical. Let us 
say that there are two locations, A and B. If location A is assigned a high priority in a retinotopic 
map, it might be beneficial to code for the location of a second saccade vector from location A to 
location B so that A and B can be visited in quick succession. Location B therefore gets assigned 
a high priority in a map centered on location A which can be thought of as stimulus-centered 
coding of space. However, if one was going to compute a priority score for all points in space 
relative to all other points in space, the computational requirements would escalate. We therefore 
hypothesize that a secondary priority map is only constructed relative to one or at least few 
locations that have already been assigned a high priority in a primary retinotopic map. Some 
psychophysical evidence has already been found for the existence of the hierarchical coding of 
location (Baylis & Driver, 1993). We leave it to future studies to explore the neural 
representation of such a hierarchical priority map. 
Going back to the Pioneer plaque introduced in chapter 1, would an alien race be able to 
decipher its message? They might not have had to hunt with bows and arrows to understand 
Pioneer’s trajectory from Earth to Jupiter and beyond our solar system. They might, however, 
need to have lived in a world with a gravitational pull and atmosphere similar to that of the 
Earth’s that would make objects move in predictable ways dependent on their shape, allowing 
the development of a visual system that was sensitive to such cues useful for predicting the 
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future from the past. In order to find their way to Earth, they might also have needed to face 
circumstances that required the development of complex spatial representations in multiple 
coordinate frames and the ability to transform such representations of space between egocentric 
and stimulus- or object-centered coordinate systems. So perhaps, sometime in the very distant 
future, we can expect a visit from intelligent extraterrestrial beings from an Earth-like 
environment that has molded their visual systems, through evolution and experience, to be – 
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